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INTRODUCTION 
 Ecclesiastes rightly declares that there is nothing new under the 
sun.1 The biblical author of course did not have contemporary 
United States tax policy in mind, but no matter: the observation fits 
just the same. Ideas about tax policy and tax reform cycle every 
few years through a narrow range of proposals that lead policy-
makers and interest groups over familiar terrain. The details may 
change modestly from one round to the next, but the outcomes are 
more or less invariant. After a few turns of the cycle, one may be 
sorely tempted to agree that the whole point of the exercise is, in 
fact, just to maintain the constant motion of the process. Policy-
makers who propose tax reforms that interest groups oppose can 
extract rents from those groups in a cynical bargain either to re-
treat from the reforms or, in the event the reforms become law, to 
undo them through future legislation.2 Old policy proposals serve 
this end just as well as new ones; indeed, old proposals may be 
preferable if they allow policymakers and interest groups to antici-
pate the endgame with greater confidence. 
Whatever the motivations that drive the cyclical nature of tax 
policy, a recent turn of the wheel has again put forth one of the 
more intriguing reform proposals: relief from the double taxation 
of corporate income. The corporate income tax is now 100 years 
1 Ecclesiastes 1:9. 
2 See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate 
and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 913 (1987); J. Mark 
Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply 
to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1155 (1989). 
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old,3 and there have been two levels of tax on corporate profits for 
most of that period.4 The first tax applies at the corporate level 
when profits are earned, and the second tax applies at the share-
holder level when profits are distributed as dividends.5 By contrast, 
profits earned by non-corporate businesses incur only a single level 
of tax.6 This double tax on corporate income is widely regarded as 
“unusual, unfair, and inefficient,”7 and numerous government and 
academic proposals would repeal it. These proposals typically pro-
vide for “integration” of the tax on corporate income and the tax 
on individual income such that corporate profits would be taxed 
exactly once.8 President Bush made the most serious joust at the 
corporate double tax in recent years when he proposed in 2003 that 
shareholders be permitted to exclude dividends from income.9 Had 
Congress enacted this dividend-exclusion proposal, it would have 
eliminated the second level of the double tax.10 Congress instead 
decided to scale back the double tax by lowering the  
tax rate that shareholders pay on dividends.11 This relief expires in  
3 Howard E. Abrams & Richard L. Doernberg, Federal Corporate Taxation 1 (6th 
ed. 2008) (“We have had a corporate income tax continuously since 1909.”). 
4 Congress enacted the double taxation of corporate income in 1936. Steven A. 
Bank, Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 167, 170–71, 228 (2002) [hereinafter Bank, Corporate Managers]; Jef-
frey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate In-
come, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 613, 619–20 (1990). 
5 Abrams & Doernberg, supra note 3, at 1. 
6 See id. at 11. 
7 Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 
105 Yale L.J. 325, 326 (1995) (footnotes omitted); see also Alvin Warren, The Rela-
tion and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 717, 
738 (1981). 
8 Abrams & Doernberg, supra note 3, at 7–16; Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Pol-
icy 179–88 (5th ed. 1987). A classic discussion of corporate double taxation and inte-
gration is Charles E. McLure, Jr., Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice? (1979). 
9 Press Release, The White House, President Discusses Taking Action to Strengthen 
America’s Economy (Jan. 7, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/
01/20030107-5.html. For extended discussion of the dividend-exclusion proposal, see 
infra Part II. 
10 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal 
Year 2004 Revenue Proposals 12 (2003), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/ 
tax-policy/library/bluebk03.pdf [hereinafter Treasury 2003 Bluebook].  
11 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-27, § 302, 117 
Stat. 752, 758 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. 1) [hereinafter Jobs and Growth 
Act].  
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2010;12 without additional legislation, the full effect of the corporate 
double tax will return in 2011. 
Proposals for further relief from the corporate double tax are 
back near the top of the tax agenda for both political parties as well 
as for both the legislative and the executive branches. Two key 
players in the formation of tax policy, the House Committee on 
Ways and Means and the Treasury Department, have given serious 
thought to lowering the tax rate on corporate income in order to 
reduce the burden imposed by the first level of the double tax. The 
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee has introduced legis-
lation that would lower the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 
30.5 percent; this would be paid for in part through the repeal of 
designated corporate tax preferences.13 The Treasury Department 
estimates that, by broadening the corporate tax base, the tax rate 
on corporations could be lowered to 28 percent without any loss of 
federal revenues.14 President Obama has suggested that proposals 
to eliminate corporate tax preferences and reduce the corporate 
tax rate may be “very appealing.”15 
One might reasonably think that integration or other double-tax 
relief should be an easy sell in the legislature. If the status quo bur-
dens corporate profits with two levels of tax, removing or reducing 
either the tax on corporations or the tax on shareholders ought to 
be attractive both to corporations and to shareholders. At a mini-
mum, removing or reducing the double tax should increase after-
12 The lower tax rates were to expire at the end of 2008, Jobs and Growth Act § 303, 
but they were extended by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 
2005, Pub. L. 109-222, § 102, 120 Stat. 345, 346 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. 1). 
13 Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 3001 (1st. Sess. 
2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 
110_cong_bills&docid=f:h3970ih.txt.pdf; see also Comm. on Ways & Means, Legisla-
tion Summary, H.R. 3970: Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007 (Oct. 29, 2007), 
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/ 110/Summary%20for%20 
Distribution.pdf. News reports indicate that the Chairman is contemplating an even 
steeper reduction in the corporate tax rate. See, e.g., Ryan J. Donmoyer & Peter 
Cook, Rangel Plans Push to Cut Top Corporate Tax Rate to 28 Percent, 
Bloomberg.com, Nov. 15, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_en 
&refer=&sid=ag7lSuB.yyII. 
14 Office of Tax Policy, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Approaches to Improve the 
Competitiveness of the U.S. Business Tax System for the 21st Century 44 (2007), 
available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hp749_approachesstudy.pdf. 
15 Michael Joe, Obama Says Corporate Rate Reduction in Exchange for Closing 
Loopholes is a Possibility, Tax Notes Today, Mar. 13, 2009, LEXIS, 2009 TNT 47-1. 
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tax returns on corporate investments, even if rent-seeking manag-
ers siphon off some of the higher returns through their compensa-
tion. And, if the economists at the Treasury Department are cor-
rect, double-tax relief should increase overall economic growth, 
potentially making everyone better off.16 Large federal budget defi-
cits should pose no obstacle: many proposals would pay for double-
tax relief by eliminating corporate tax preferences (pejoratively 
known as “loopholes” and “tax breaks”). Why, then, does Con-
gress not enact integration or other double-tax relief by acclama-
tion? 
There being nothing new under the sun, the legislature has con-
sidered and rejected many integration proposals over the years.17 
There are occasional changes at the margins, with the current (but 
temporary) reduced tax rates on dividends possibly setting the 
high-water mark for double-tax relief. But, as this Article will ar-
gue, the “unusual, unfair, and inefficient” double taxation of cor-
porate profits generally has survived recent political challenge be-
cause many managers, shareholders, and third parties rationally 
prefer having the double tax to not having it. More precisely, the 
substantial heterogeneity of interests among managers, sharehold-
ers, and collateral interests affected by the double tax ensures that 
there are winners as well as losers under the status quo. Many cor-
porations have low effective tax rates that translate into low costs 
of equity capital; many shareholders are entirely or partly exempt 
from tax, and several industries depend on the existence of the 
double tax so that they can sell investments sheltered from it. 
These and other managers, shareholders, and collateral interests 
benefit from the status quo. Yet, other managers, shareholders, 
and collateral interests—including corporations with high effective 
tax rates and fully taxable shareholders—do not. Double-tax win-
ners have no rational basis to support integration proposals that 
would equalize the after-tax outcomes for themselves and the dou-
16 U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Conference on Business Taxation and 
Global Competitiveness Background Paper 1–2, 710 (2007), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/07230%20r.pdf [hereinafter Treasury 
Background Paper]. 
17 See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 330 (citing unsuccessful bills). 
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ble-tax losers with whom they compete in the capital and business 
markets. 
The literature on the corporate double tax has missed this criti-
cal point. The most prominent political explanation for the persis-
tence of the double tax is the agency-cost explanation set forth by 
Jennifer Arlen and Deborah Weiss.18 They argue that shareholders, 
who face collective-action and other obstacles to lobbying, gener-
ally favor repeal of the double tax but that managers, who control 
the lobbying resources of their corporations, generally assign low 
priority to integration and in some cases oppose it outright.19 Thus, 
they conclude that “the resilience of the corporate [double] tax is a 
manifestation of the most enduring source of problems in corpo-
rate law, the separation between ownership and control of large 
corporations.”20 This agency-cost explanation, however, does not 
adequately account for important points, including the substantial 
18 Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7. Their analysis remains widely cited and generally 
accepted. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Decoding the U.S. Corporate Tax 20 (2009); 
Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 Geo. 
L.J. 889, 894 (2006) [hereinafter Bank, Capital Lock-In Theory]; Bank, Corporate 
Managers, supra note 4, at 260–61; Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the 
Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 447, 534–37 (2001) 
[hereinafter Bank, Entity Theory]; Yariv Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply to 
New Corporate Income Tax Advocacy, 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 591, 593 n.7; Terrence 
R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 Wake Forest 
L. Rev. 239, 259 (2003); Joshua Mishkin, The State of Integration in a Partial Integra-
tion State, 59 Tax Law. 1047, 1057–58 (2006); Anthony P. Polito, Advancing to Cor-
porate Tax Integration: A Laissez-Faire Approach, 55 S.C. L. Rev. 1, 34–36 (2003); 
Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the Handmaiden of 
Budget Policy, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 503, 517 (2007); Razeen Sappideen, Imputation of the 
Corporate and Personal Income Tax: Is It Chasing One’s Tail?, 15 Am. J. Tax Pol’y 
167, 184–85, 202–03 (1998); Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not to Praise the Corporate 
Income Tax, But to Save It, 56 Tax L. Rev. 329, 337 n.11 (2003); David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 
Vand. L. Rev. 647, 667–68 (1997) (book review). For similar agency-cost accounts, see 
James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder 
Interests, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 697, 716 (1997); Herwig J. Schlunk, The Zen of Cor-
porate Capital Structure Neutrality, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 410, 411 n.8 (2000). 
19 Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 327. 
20 Id. Without specifically endorsing the analysis of Arlen & Weiss, Alvin Warren 
has argued that, “with rare exceptions, corporate management remarkably has been 
uninterested in proposals that would eliminate the double taxation of corporate in-
come distributed to shareholders as dividends” and that, “[g]iven the choice, corpo-
rate management seems to prefer corporate tax reductions through reduced rates or 
accelerated capital cost deductions . . . .” Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Three Versions of Tax 
Reform, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 157, 173 (1997). 
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heterogeneity of interests that managers, shareholders, and other 
parties have with respect to the double tax or the differential ef-
fects that various integration models would have on managers, 
shareholders, and other parties. Once the double-tax winners and 
losers are identified and the differential effects on those winners 
and losers are sorted out, it becomes clear that the persistence of 
the corporate double tax cannot be explained simply as a failure of 
managers to act in the interests of shareholders. Instead, the under-
lying political problem is more nuanced, more complex, and more 
intractable. 
This Article will make three distinct contributions to the existing 
literature. First, it will examine the heterogeneity of interests 
among managers, shareholders, and other parties regarding the 
double tax and the differential effects of various integration pro-
posals on those heterogeneous interests. This examination will sug-
gest that the persistence of the corporate double tax can be attrib-
uted not to the divergence of interests between managers 
(understood as a single group) and shareholders (understood as a 
single group) but to the divergence of interests among managers, 
the divergence of interests among shareholders, and the divergence 
of interests among other parties affected by the double tax. The 
examination will also establish why certain managers, shareholders, 
and third parties rationally support certain approaches to eliminat-
ing the corporate double tax while other managers, shareholders, 
and third parties rationally oppose those approaches but support 
different approaches. Second, this Article will provide a detailed 
account of the actual lobbying positions taken by managers, share-
holders, and collateral interests during the pendency of the Bush 
administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal. That account will 
provide clear and substantial support for the argument that the 
story of the corporate double tax must include substantial hetero-
geneity of interests within the key interest groups. The Bush ad-
ministration’s proposal failed because managers, shareholders, and 
collateral interests lined up on both sides of it and fought to a near 
standstill; the lowering of dividend tax rates that Congress ulti-
mately enacted was simply a compromise that found the broadest 
support within and among these groups. Third, this Article will 
draw out general conclusions and tentative predictions implied by 
DORAN_BOOK 4/15/2009 11:44 AM 
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this political account of the corporate double tax. Specifically, the 
analysis will demonstrate that any integration proposal will elicit 
both support and opposition from among managers, shareholders, 
and other parties. This inevitability of political winners and losers 
implies both that the corporate double tax is well entrenched and 
that policymakers interested in repealing the double tax should 
pursue integration methods that provide the greatest flexibility for 
adjustment and accommodation during the legislative process. Ul-
timately, however, politically viable integration may prove no more 
attractive than the status quo. 
I. HETEROGENEITY AND THE CORPORATE DOUBLE TAX 
This Part argues that the heterogeneity of interests among man-
agers, shareholders, and third parties grounds the persistence of 
the corporate double tax. Section A sets out the mechanics of the 
double tax, including the temporary relief enacted by Congress in 
2003. Section B explains why the persistence of the double tax pre-
sents a puzzle to legal scholars and discusses the agency-cost ex-
planation of that puzzle. Section C examines the pervasive hetero-
geneity of interests among managers, shareholders, and third 
parties, and it argues that any approach to eliminating or mitigating 
the corporate double tax will provoke both support and opposition 
from within each of those groups. 
A. The Mechanics of the Double Tax 
The mechanics of the corporate double tax are reasonably 
straightforward.21 The Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on the 
“taxable income” of every corporation.22 A corporation’s “taxable 
income” includes its income less certain deductions,23 such as the 
ordinary and necessary expenses of conducting its business.24 The 
corporation may be entitled to certain tax preferences (special tax 
breaks subsidizing particular investments made by the corpora-
21 For a thoughtful discussion of the principles underlying the corporate double tax, 
see generally Robert Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay 
in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 Yale L. J. 90 (1977). 
22 I.R.C. § 11(a) (West 2008). 
23 I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 63(a) (West 2008). 
24 I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2008). 
DORAN_BOOK 4/15/2009 11:44 AM 
 
2009] The Corporate Double Tax 525 
 
tion), but the basic scheme taxes the corporation’s net business 
profits at a flat rate of 35 percent.25 The corporation’s business 
profits are taxed a second time when distributed to the corpora-
tion’s shareholders as a dividend.26 Assuming the dividend were 
taxable as ordinary income, the tax rate paid by shareholders 
would range from 10 percent (for lower-income shareholders) to 35 
percent (for higher-income shareholders).27 To illustrate: if a corpo-
ration with one shareholder earns net business profits of $100 and 
pays a corporate-level tax of $35, it will have $65 available for dis-
tribution as a dividend. If the shareholder is subject to the 35-
percent tax rate, she will pay $22.75 of tax on the $65 dividend, and 
she will net $42.25 in after-tax profits.28 The $100 of distributed 
business profits is taxed twice: once to the corporation and again to 
the shareholder.29 
The outcome would be different if the $100 were earned by a 
non-corporate business. If the shareholder earned the $100 through 
a sole proprietorship, she would pay a single level of tax at her 35-
percent rate, and she would net $65 in after-tax profits. Similarly, if 
she earned the $100 through a partnership, she would pay a single 
level of tax at her 35-percent rate and would net $65 in after-tax 
profits. In either case, she would improve her after-tax return by 
$22.75. The difference, of course, is simply the imposition of a sin-
gle tax rather than a double tax. The non-corporate business profits 
bear one level of tax at a 35-percent rate; the corporate business 
profits bear two levels of tax at a combined 57.75-percent rate. 
Congress enacted partial and temporary relief from the corpo-
rate double tax in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
25 I.R.C. § 11(b) (West 2008). Although there is progressivity built into the rate 
schedule, any corporation with at least moderate income (by corporate standards) is 
taxed at a flat rate of 35 percent. Abrams & Doernberg, supra note 3, at 55. 
26 I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(7), 301(c)(1) (West 2008). 
27 I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) (West 2008). 
28 As discussed below, the shareholder generally would pay tax on the dividend at a 
15-percent tax rate under temporary legislation enacted in 2003; the 35-percent rate is 
used here for illustrative purposes. 
29 If the corporation had not distributed its $65 after-tax profits to the shareholder as 
a dividend, the value of the corporation’s shares would have increased by $65; the 
shareholder would pay a shareholder-level tax on the $65 upon selling her shares. 
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Act of 2003 (the “Jobs and Growth Act”).30 The Jobs and Growth 
Act provided that most dividends would be taxed at capital gains 
rates ranging from 0 percent (for lower-income shareholders) to 15 
percent (for higher-income shareholders).31 The effect should be 
readily apparent. If the corporation from the example above earns 
$100 of net business profits, pays $35 of corporate income tax, and 
distributes the remaining $65 as a dividend, the shareholder will 
pay $9.75 of tax on the dividend (assuming the 15-percent tax rate). 
This will leave her with $55.25 of after-tax profits—less than the 
$65 available through a non-corporate investment but more than 
the $42.25 available through the corporate investment when the 
dividend is taxed as ordinary income. And, in fact, this result was 
intended to stake out a middle position. The Jobs and Growth Act 
was a compromise among President Bush, who wanted a complete 
exclusion of dividends,32 the Senate, which would only pass a 
scaled-back version of the dividend exclusion,33 and the House, 
which would not agree to eliminate the shareholder-level tax.34 
Apart from the relief under the Jobs and Growth Act, the tax 
code provides other approaches for corporations and shareholders 
to sidestep the double tax. The tax code includes numerous corpo-
rate tax preferences that shelter corporate income. Additionally, a 
corporation can substitute debt financing for equity financing and 
claim deductions that effectively remove the corporate-level tax on 
business profits paid out as interest.35 Other mechanisms reduce or 
eliminate the double tax at the shareholder level. A corporation 
may redeem stock held by shareholders as a way of distributing 
profits without paying dividends. The redemption, if treated as a 
sale,36 allows shareholders to recover their basis in the redeemed 
stock before including any portion of the proceeds in income. 
30  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-27, § 302, 
117 Stat. 752, 758 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. 1).  
31 Id. The lower rates apply to “qualified dividend income”—generally defined as 
dividends received from domestic corporations and specific types of foreign corpora-
tions. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B) (West 2008). 
32 Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra note 10, at 12; Press Release, The White House, 
supra note 9; see also infra Part II. 
33 S. 1054, 108th Cong. §201 (as passed by Senate, May 15, 2003). 
34 H.R. 2, 108th Cong. §302 (as passed by House, May 9, 2003). 
35 I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 2008). 
36 The tax code treats certain redemptions (particularly those that are proportional 
among shareholders) as dividends rather than as sales. I.R.C. § 302 (West 2008). 
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Dividends received by shareholders that are exempt from tax, such 
as charitable organizations and tax-qualified retirement plans, bear 
no shareholder-level tax. Dividends received by shareholders that 
are themselves corporations are covered by a dividends-received 
deduction of up to 100 percent.37 
Still, there are limits to how many tax preferences a corporation 
can claim, how much debt it can issue, how many of its own shares 
it can redeem, and how many of its shareholders are exempt from 
tax or are also corporations. There are limits, in other words, to 
how much the corporation and its shareholders can avoid double 
taxation of the corporation’s distributed profits. The tax law must 
therefore distinguish between those businesses treated as corpora-
tions and those treated otherwise. As a general proposition, any 
business with interests that are publicly traded is classified as a 
corporation and is subject to the corporate double tax; any other 
business is classified as a non-corporate business and is not subject 
to the double tax unless the owner or owners of the business elect 
to treat the business as a corporation.38 
37 I.R.C. § 243 (West 2008). 
38 The path to this outcome is somewhat tortuous, but the result is clear. The tax 
code defines a “corporation” to include an association, joint-stock company, and in-
surance company, and it defines a “partnership” to include a syndicate, group, pool, 
joint venture, “or other unincorporated organization” that is not a trust, estate, or 
corporation for tax purposes. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2), (3) (West 2008). The so-called 
“check-the-box” regulations expressly provide that unincorporated businesses gener-
ally will be treated as partnerships (if there are two or more owners) or as disregarded 
entities (if there is only a single owner). Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1), (2) (2008). 
But see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(2)-(8) (2008) (providing corporate status for cer-
tain businesses even if not incorporated). The check-the-box regulations also provide, 
however, that the owners of any partnership or disregarded entity can elect to treat 
the business as a corporation for tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (2008). Al-
though no election out of corporate status can be made by the owners of an incorpo-
rated business, see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (2008), there is no tax rule that re-
quires the owners to incorporate the business in the first place. Hence, the rule is 
genuinely elective through two distinct steps: first, by the decision whether to incor-
porate the business (if the business is incorporated, the double tax applies); and sec-
ond, by a check-the-box election made for any unincorporated business (if an election 
is made for an unincorporated business, the double tax applies). But cutting across the 
check-the-box regulations is a statutory rule providing (with narrow exceptions) that 
any publicly traded partnership will be treated as a corporation for tax purposes. 
I.R.C. § 7704(a) (West 2008). Thus (ignoring the narrow exceptions), it is not possible 
for a publicly traded business to avoid the double tax: it will either be a publicly 
traded incorporated business, in which case the check-the-box regulations will pull it 
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Thus, the corporate double tax is a mandatory outcome for all 
publicly traded businesses—but only for publicly traded businesses. 
If one assumes that investors prefer to avoid the double taxation of 
business profits, one would expect that owners of privately held 
businesses generally will structure those businesses to avoid being 
treated as corporations for tax purposes.39 Whether it makes policy 
sense or not, the corporate double tax serves as a toll charge im-
posed by the government on accessing capital through the securi-
ties markets. Equity investments made in businesses that are 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and similar 
exchanges and markets bear heavier taxation than equity invest-
ments made in other businesses. Thus, all else equal, the cost of 
capital to privately held businesses should be lower than that of 
publicly held businesses, with the difference attributable to the 
corporate double tax. The playing field is not level as to public and 
private businesses but (at least at first glance) is level as to public 
businesses. To the extent that public businesses compete with pri-
vate businesses for equity capital, the double tax puts the public 
businesses at a disadvantage; to the extent that public businesses 
compete with each other for equity capital, the double tax (again, 
at first glance) applies to all alike. 
B. The Paradox of the Double Tax 
The continuing existence of the corporate double tax is para-
doxical. Both policymakers and academics generally agree that the 
double tax results in significant distortions of economic and busi-
ness decisions and argue for its repeal.40 The double tax plainly 
into corporate status and the double tax; or it will be a publicly traded unincorporated 
business, in which case the statute will pull it into corporate status and the double tax. 
(Note that this discussion ignores any potential for status as an S corporation, which 
effectively is not available for publicly traded businesses.). 
39 The owner or owners of a privately held business might determine that there are 
good tax reasons for electing into the corporate double tax. For example, the owner 
or owners may be able to manage the taxable income of their business by paying more 
or less of its profits out as deductible compensation, and they may be able to take ad-
vantage of the graduated rate structure applicable to corporations with comparatively 
smaller taxable incomes. There also may be non-tax considerations that lead investors 
to incorporate a privately held business. 
40 On the government side, see The President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Re-
form, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System 60, 124–
25, 162 (2005) [hereinafter Advisory Panel Report]; Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra 
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provides incentives for new investment through unincorporated 
businesses, which distorts the allocation of capital across the corpo-
rate and non-corporate sectors.41 It encourages corporate financing 
note 10, at 12; U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, A Recommendation for Integration of the 
Individual and Corporate Tax Systems 2 (1992); U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Report 
of the Department of the Treasury on Integration of the Individual and Corporate 
Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once (1992) [hereinafter Treasury Integration 
Report]; The White House, The President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fair-
ness, Growth, and Simplicity 117, 120–29 (1985) [hereinafter, Treasury II]; U.S. Dep’t 
of the Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, Volume 
2: General Explanation of the Treasury Department Proposals 134–44 (1984) [herein-
after Treasury I]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Tax Reform Option Papers Prepared by 
Treasury Department on September 2, 1977 for the White House, 196 Daily Tax Rep.  
49–53 (Supp. 1977)[hereinafter Treasury Option Papers]; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 4–5, 68–75 (1977) [hereinafter Treasury Blueprints]. 
On the academic side, see, for example, Am. Law Inst., Federal Income Tax Project: 
Integration of the Individual and Corporate Income Taxes: Reporter’s Study of Cor-
porate Tax Integration (Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Reporter) (1993) [hereinafter Warren 
ALI Integration Study]; Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-
Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 Tax L. Rev. 265 (1995); 
Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The 
Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 532 (1975); John 
K. McNulty, Reform of the Individual Income Tax by Integration of the Corporate 
Income Tax, 46 Tax Notes 1445 (1990); Fred W. Peel, A Proposal for Eliminating 
Double Taxation of Corporate Dividends, 39 Tax Law. 1 (1985); Scott A. Taylor, 
Corporate Integration in the Federal Income Tax: Lessons from the Past and a Pro-
posal for the Future, 10 Va. Tax Rev. 237 (1990); Anthony P. Polito, Note, A Pro-
posal for an Integrated Income Tax, 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1009 (1989). For criti-
cisms of both the Treasury Integration Report and the Warren ALI Integration 
Study, see Michael L. Schler, Taxing Corporate Income Once (or Hopefully Not at 
All): A Practitioner’s Comparison of the Treasury and ALI Integration Models, 47 
Tax L. Rev. 509 (1992). There have also been proposals to address the distortions of 
the corporate double tax short of integration. See, e.g., Am. Law Inst., Subchapter C 
(Supplemental Study) (William D. Andrews, Reporter) (1989) [hereinafter Andrews 
ALI Supplemental Study]; Am. Law Inst., Subchapter C: Proposals on Corporate Ac-
quisitions and Dispositions and Reporter’s Study on Corporate Distributions (Wil-
liam D. Andrews, Reporter) (1982) [hereinafter Andrews ALI Study]; George K. 
Yin, A Different Approach to the Taxation of Corporate Distributions: Theory and 
Implementation of a Uniform Corporate-Level Distributions Tax, 78 Geo. L.J. 1837 
(1990); Ethan Yale, A Better Way to Tax Corporate Distributions: Allow Basis Re-
covery on Ordinary Dividends (Sept. 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Virginia Law Review Association). 
41 Advisory Panel Report, supra note 40, at 99; Treasury Integration Report, supra 
note 40, at 3. One would expect that, in equilibrium, the pre-tax rate of return avail-
able through unincorporated businesses should fall and the pre-tax rate of return 
through incorporated businesses should rise such that, all else equal, the after-tax 
rates of return should be equivalent. Warren, supra note 7, at 725. Even then, how-
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through debt rather than equity, which increases the risk of corpo-
rate insolvency.42 The double tax also encourages the retention of 
earnings in the corporation.43 Although this may facilitate long-
term corporate investments,44 it may also decrease shareholder 
monitoring of managerial investment decisions.45 Those distortions 
probably reduce economic growth, making everyone worse off.46 
Most (although not all47) academic commentators therefore have 
agreed with the Treasury Department that Congress should inte-
grate the corporate and individual income taxes. 
At first, integration would appear generally to advance the in-
terests both of corporations and shareholders. On the one hand, 
repeal of the double tax should lower the cost of equity capital for 
ever, one would expect that “the total amount of capital investment, as well as the 
relative size of the corporate and non-corporate sectors, might not be optimal.” Id. at 
737. 
42 Office of Tax Policy, supra note 14, at 81; Advisory Panel Report, supra note 40, 
at 99–100. 
43 Advisory Panel Report, supra note 40, at 100; Treasury Integration Report, supra 
note 40, at 13, 116–18. 
44 Bank, Capital Lock-In Theory, supra note 18, at 901. 
45 See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 348. 
46 See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 111–12 (calculating the eco-
nomic losses of the corporate double tax from $2.5 to $25 billion per year). 
47 For arguments in favor of retaining the corporate double tax, see generally, 
Chorvat, supra note 18; Rebecca S. Rudnick, Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a 
Flat Tax World?, 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 965, 1081–99 (1989); Stanley S. Surrey, Re-
flections on “Integration” of Corporation and Individual Income Taxes, 28 Nat’l Tax 
J. 335 (1975). Of course, not every defense of the corporate income tax is also a de-
fense of the corporate double tax as it currently exists in the United States. See, e.g., 
Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 
77 Va. L. Rev. 211 (1991); Schlunk, supra note 18. Reuven Avi-Yonah argues that the 
corporate income tax can be “justified as a means to control the excessive accumula-
tion of power in the hands of corporate management.” Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corpo-
rations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1193, 
1244 (2004). He argues that such control cannot “be effectively achieved in a capitalist 
economy by means other than a corporate tax imposed at a significant rate.” Id. at 
1249. There are two problems with this argument, however. First, although Avi-
Yonah asserts that this justification lines up “more or less precisely [with] the current 
scope of the tax we have today,” id. at 1245, it actually would justify a tax on any large 
concentration of wealth—not just concentrations that issue shares on public ex-
changes and markets. Second, as the conditional tax-exempt status of tax-qualified 
retirement plans and charitable organizations demonstrates, it is possible to exert sub-
stantial public control over private concentrations of wealth even with a zero-percent 
tax rate. For an historical argument linking the corporate income tax to corporate 
regulation, see generally Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Ori-
gins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 Ind. L.J. 53 (1990). 
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corporations, allowing managers to finance a broader range of in-
vestment opportunities through new equity.48 Additionally, less re-
liance on debt financing should decrease the risk of corporate in-
solvency, which should also decrease the riskiness of manager 
investments in their firm-specific human capital. On the other 
hand, managers may prefer to finance corporate investments with 
retained earnings rather than new equity investments, and the 
double tax may facilitate that strategy through a lower tax burden 
on undistributed corporate profits.49 Shareholders may also benefit 
from integration if repeal of the double tax increases share values.50 
Although no one knows the exact economic incidence of the cor-
porate-level tax,51 integration may relieve shareholders of whatever 
corporate-level taxes they actually bear. 
If the double tax binds only businesses that are large enough and 
sophisticated enough to issue publicly traded securities, why are 
those businesses and their owners not powerful enough to force its 
repeal? And why is the general consensus among policymakers and 
academics favoring integration not adequate, with or without the 
self-interested lobbying of corporations and shareholders? Expla-
nations assuming that legislators wrongly conceive of the double 
tax only as a burden on profit-mongering corporations and share-
holders have little plausibility.52 Explanations that rely on the ob-
48 To the extent that integration were to cause investments to shift from non-
corporate to corporate equity and thereby increase the cost of capital for non-
corporate businesses, managers of non-corporate businesses might become more con-
strained in their own business investments. 
49 See Bank, Capital Lock-In Theory, supra note 18, at 939–42; Arlen & Weiss, su-
pra note 7, at 356–59. 
50  The effect of integration on share values is not clear. See infra note 57. 
51 See Pechman, supra note 8, at 141–46; Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the 
Corporation Income Tax Revisited, 61 Nat’l Tax J. 303 (2008); Alan J. Auerbach, 
Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 11686, 2005). 
52 See, e.g., Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 331–33. For arguments against other ex-
planations of the corporate tax, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 47, at 1197–212. Bank of-
fers a different explanation for the corporate income tax. His account centers on capi-
tal lock-in, the legal power of corporate boards to refuse to release capital from the 
corporation. Bank, Capital Lock-In Theory, supra note 18, at 892–93. He argues that 
the corporate income tax is a “pro-business compromise between the retained earn-
ings penalty that could result from partnership or accrual-style taxation and the in-
definite deferral that would result from having only a distributions tax.” Id. at 894. 
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scure incidence of the corporate income tax similarly do not ac-
count for the failure of integration.53 It is more plausible that some-
one legislators care about—that is, some powerful or influential in-
terest group—is either not pushing hard enough for integration or, 
more likely, is pushing hard against it. The most prominent politi-
cal explanation for the persistence of the corporate double tax is 
the agency-cost explanation.54 That explanation attributes the “re-
silience” of the corporate double tax to “the separation between 
ownership and control of large corporations.”55 Shareholders of 
public companies “invariably” support tax changes that increase 
the value of existing capital.56 Assuming that share values prior to 
elimination of the double tax reflect the anticipated burden of the 
double tax,57 integration would “confer windfalls on existing share-
holders.”58 Integration would decrease the anticipated tax burden 
on corporate profits, and that, all else equal, would cause share 
values to rise.59 Shareholders, the explanation argues, therefore 
Whether Bank is correct or not is beside the point for present purposes. Even if his 
account is right, it only explains the existence of a corporate-level tax; it does not ex-
plain the corporate double tax. Any concerns about a “retained earnings penalty” and 
“indefinite deferral” could be addressed with a corporate-level tax alone. 
53 The intuition here is captured by the familiar aphorism of Senator Russell Long 
(“Don’t tax you; don’t tax me; tax that man behind the tree.”). One might think that, 
because the incidence of the corporate income tax is not entirely understood, neither 
managers nor shareholders have clear incentives to lobby for its repeal. That explana-
tion, however, falls short for two reasons. First, at best it explains only the persistence 
of the corporate income tax; it does not account for the persistence of the corporate 
double tax. Second, it does not account for the substantial resources that managers 
commit to seeking corporate tax preferences that mitigate the effect of the corporate-
level tax. 
54 See generally Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7. 
55 Id. at 327. 
56 Id. at 336. 
57 That assumption—based on the “new view” that dividend taxes are capitalized 
into share values—is controversial. See generally Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Has-
sett, On the Marginal Source of Investment Funds, 87 J. Pub. Econ. 205 (2003); 
George R. Zodrow, On the “Traditional” and “New” Views of Dividend Taxation, 44 
Nat’l Tax J. 497 (1991); see also Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 116–
18; Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 33–39; Warren, supra note 7, at 
753–54, 757. 
58 Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 338. 
59 Id. Of course, integration would also lower the tax burden on new equity, but that 
lower burden would be capitalized into the value of the new equity at the time the in-
vestment is made. Id. 
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support integration.60 Managers of public corporations, by contrast, 
“are primarily concerned with stimulating new investment.”61 Tax 
preferences such as accelerated depreciation for new machinery 
enable managers “to expand their firms by increasing the after-tax 
profitability of new investments.”62 That, in turn, raises manager re-
turns on the human-capital investments they make in their compa-
nies.63 Corporate “[m]anagers therefore attach a low priority to in-
tegration, which provides a large windfall to existing capital, and 
only a small stimulus to new investment.”64 
The agency-cost explanation thus characterizes the conflict as 
the result of managers and shareholders assigning different priori-
ties to tax subsidies for existing investments and tax subsidies for 
new investments.65 Shareholders, the explanation maintains, are not 
hostile to subsidies for new investments;66 they simply prefer wind-
falls for their existing shares. Similarly, managers “prefer to lobby 
for [corporate tax preferences] that may be less advantageous to 
shareholders but are more cost-effective in stimulating invest-
ment.”67 Managers “do not actively oppose” integration,68 but they 
60 Id. at 341. 
61 Id. at 336. 
62 Id. at 341. That assertion of the agency-cost explanation, although broadly accu-
rate, overlooks the possibility that such tax preferences may benefit old capital as well 
as new capital. Congress can extend new tax preferences to pre-enactment invest-
ments, thereby conferring windfall gains on corporations that have made past invest-
ments in whatever activities are covered by the new preferences. Additionally, even 
tax preferences that are prospective only may subsidize past investments. For exam-
ple, the enactment of favorable cost-recovery rules for new industrial factories and 
equipment will increase the value of past decisions made by corporate managers to 
begin or continue manufacturing operations. Thus, if Congress were to allow expens-
ing of all machinery placed into service during the first two years after enactment, 
there would be a large windfall to Boeing, Ford, and similar corporations. 
63 Id. at 336, 341. 
64 Id. at 336; see also id. at 342 (“Managers have testified in favor of integration, but 
they have generally reserved their active lobbying efforts for tax preferences for new 
investments . . . .”); id. at 344 (“Although managers have supported integration, they 
have consistently preferred other measures that would reduce corporate sector 
taxes.”). 
65 Id. at 338. 
66 Id. at 336 (“Shareholders . . . sometimes, but not always, support policies that 
stimulate investment.”). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
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“have chosen not to lobby vigorously for [it].”69 However, share-
holders face collective-action problems and other obstacles to lob-
bying,70 and that leaves managers as “the only vocal public partici-
pants” in debates over integration proposals.71 Thus, “managerial 
diffidence” is “the key to explaining the failure of integration ef-
forts.”72 
The agency-cost explanation recognizes that some managers 
may take stronger positions supporting or opposing integration, 
but it considers those managers to be outliers. Thus, “[a] few man-
agers” of corporations that cannot take advantage of existing tax 
preferences may support integration, but even these managers 
would prefer the enactment of new preferences.73 Other managers 
may actively oppose integration because the double tax facilitates 
trapping earnings inside the corporation:74 the fact that the double 
tax burdens distributed corporate earnings more than retained 
earnings reduces shareholder demand for dividends and encour-
ages managers to use retained earnings as a source for financing 
corporate investments.75 Even so, the agency-cost explanation ar-
gues that only “[a] small group” of corporate managers actively re-
sists integration by reason of this retained-earnings trap.76 The basic 
story remains one of manager diffidence to integration. 
There are, however, good reasons to doubt the agency-cost ex-
planation. The explanation argues that the double tax creates a 
wedge between the interests of shareholders, who generally prefer 
integration to targeted tax preferences, and the interests of manag-
69 Id. at 327. 
70 Id. at 363. 
71 Id. at 328. 
72 Id. at 327. Others had reached a similar conclusion before Arlen and Weiss pub-
lished their analysis. See Robert J. Leonard, A Pragmatic View of Corporate Integra-
tion, 35 Tax Notes 889, 894–95 (1987); Lee A. Sheppard, Corporate Tax Integration, 
the Proper Way to Eliminate the Corporate Tax, 27 Tax Notes 637, 647 n.15 (1985).  
73 Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 342. 
74 Id. at 348. Alternatively, some managers may oppose integration if they believe 
that the revenue cost of eliminating the double tax will be offset by the elimination of 
corporate tax preferences. Id. at 341, 347. 
75 Id. at 348–61. Bank, however, argues that “[t]he notion that retained earnings be-
came trapped in the corporation because of double taxation is a myth.” Steven A. 
Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? Evidence from His-
tory, 56 Tax L. Rev. 463, 466 (2003). 
76 Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 348. 
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ers, who generally prefer targeted tax preferences to integration. 
But that argument minimizes important differences among share-
holders, among managers, and among the terms of different inte-
gration models. It also ignores entirely the interests of third parties 
affected by integration. Although the agency-cost explanation ac-
knowledges some heterogeneity among managers and among 
shareholders, it does not consider heterogeneity to be the driving 
force in the political economy of the double tax. Rather, the 
agency-cost explanation centers on the divergence between the in-
terests of managers as a group and the interests of shareholders as 
a group. In other words, to the extent that the agency-cost explana-
tion sees heterogeneity among the relevant interests, the explana-
tion nonetheless fails to draw the right conclusions from it. At best, 
the agency-cost explanation accounts for only one aspect of a con-
siderably more complex and nuanced story about the political 
economy of the corporate double tax. 
C. Heterogeneity of Interests and Effects 
The tax positions and interests of managers are heterogeneous; 
so too are the tax positions and interests of shareholders. The dou-
ble tax does not have uniform effects on corporations as a group or 
on shareholders as a group, and the unevenness of the corporate-
level and shareholder-level taxes leaves certain managers and 
shareholders better off under the status quo than other managers 
and shareholders. Additionally, there are collateral interests on 
both the manager side and the shareholder side that have eco-
nomic stakes in the double tax.77 In many cases, those stakes consist 
of selling investments that reduce or eliminate either the corpo-
rate-level or shareholder-level tax. This heterogeneity of interests 
among managers, among shareholders, and among third parties 
77 As used here, the term “collateral interest” generally refers to a party with an in-
terest in the corporate double tax other than as a manager or shareholder. A party 
will be referred to as a collateral interest on the manager side if the party’s interest in 
the double tax relates primarily to the corporate-level tax, and a party will be referred 
to as a collateral interest on the shareholder side if its interest in the double tax re-
lates primarily to the shareholder-level tax. For example, a trade association repre-
senting alternative energy is a collateral interest on the manager side because corpo-
rate investments in alternative energy generally qualify for corporate tax preferences. 
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makes it treacherous to generalize about policy preferences on 
eliminating or mitigating the double tax. Additionally, integration 
itself is not a monolith. Policymakers and academics have proposed 
numerous integration models, and these models would have vary-
ing effects on different corporations, shareholders, and collateral 
interests. Even if one reasonably assumes that all affected parties 
would respond to integration legislation with rational self-interest, 
mapping out their positions ex ante is not straightforward. The po-
tential effects on manager, shareholder, and third-party interests 
are sufficiently disparate to ensure that any proposal for integra-
tion will draw both political support and political opposition from 
within each group.78 
1. Managers and Collateral Interests 
The corporate double tax creates several potential fault lines 
among managers.79 First, many managers occupy a dual position: 
they are both managers and shareholders. Managers often own 
substantial equity stakes in their companies; in certain cases, direc-
tors set a minimum number of shares that managers must own. Al-
though managers may buy shares on the open market, most of 
their shares are provided as compensation. These include shares 
granted outright, shares acquired through the exercise of stock op-
tions, and restricted shares in which the managers vest over time by 
continuing in their positions. The equity interest of managers is 
larger still once other stock-based compensation—such as “phan-
tom” shares and unexercised stock options—are taken into ac-
count. Thus, if integration does create a windfall for existing stock 
investments, managers with substantial shareholdings may be eager 
to eliminate the double tax. Managers do not face the same collec-
tive-action problems that generally prevent other individual share-
78 For an early analysis of the interest-group effects of integration, including discus-
sion about the heterogeneity of interests among managers and among shareholders, 
see Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Stanley S. Surrey, Integration of Income Taxes: Issues 
for Debate, 55 Harv. Bus. Rev. 169, 174–81 (1977). 
79 See Cathie J. Martin, Shifting the Burden: The Struggle over Growth and Corpo-
rate Taxation 35 (1991) (“The most notable characteristic of the business community 
in the United States is its high degree of fragmentation. . . . Fragmentation in the 
business community means that no unambiguous class mandate for corporate taxation 
is expressed.”). 
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holders from lobbying; in fact, managers are uniquely positioned to 
determine the lobbying positions of their corporations and to de-
ploy substantial corporate resources in support of those positions. 
But other managers—perhaps those with smaller shareholdings—
may not consider the prospect of a personal windfall as a reason 
for positioning their companies in favor of integration; these man-
agers might decide their corporations’ lobbying positions based on 
their self-interest as managers rather than their self-interest as 
shareholders.80 
Even if managers ignore their own interests as shareholders, 
they may adopt different stances on integration because their com-
panies may have different tax burdens. The corporate-level tax sets 
a deceptively simple baseline: corporate profits are taxed at a flat 
35% rate. But this baseline exists only as an abstraction; the tax 
code contains numerous corporate tax preferences of varying scope 
and applicability that make the corporate-level tax as applied very 
uneven. These preferences provide “a special exclusion, exemp-
tion, or deduction[,] a special [tax] credit, a preferential rate of tax, 
or a deferral of tax liability”81 intended by Congress to encourage 
certain types of corporate investments. Because they are limited to 
particular industries, or even to particular corporations, they dis-
tribute unequal tax subsidies and create uneven tax burdens. 
For example, current law provides a tax credit for engaging in 
research and development activities82 and allows for the expensing 
of certain research and experiment costs.83 These preferences are 
worth over $9 billion each year to corporations that engage in such 
80 In general, manager compensation has become more heavily concentrated in the 
equity of their own companies since the middle of the 1990s. The effect of this devel-
opment on the political economy of the double tax could not have been incorporated, 
then, into the agency-cost explanation. To the extent, however, that managers held 
significant shareholdings (whether or not of their own companies) prior to the middle 
of the 1990s, managers occupied a dual position that could have been incorporated 
into the agency-cost explanation. 
81 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 § 3(3), 2 U.S.C. § 
622 (2000). For the sake of simplicity, the discussion in this Subsection (I.C.1), con-
cerning corporate tax preferences, ignores the effects of the corporate alternative 
minimum tax. 
82 I.R.C. § 41 (West 2008). 
83 Id. § 174 (West 2008). 
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activities (such as defense contractors),84 but they are useless to 
corporations that do not (such as interstate bus companies). Cor-
porations engaged in foreign activities benefit from a deferral of 
active income from their controlled foreign corporations and other 
preferences related to foreign activities. These preferences are 
worth almost $20 billion to corporations having international busi-
ness transactions, but nothing to corporations with purely domestic 
activities.85 Numerous preferences for energy-related industries 
provide corporate tax benefits worth about $6.5 billion;86 acceler-
ated depreciation for machinery and business property confers 
preferences of almost $20 billion;87 a special deduction for domestic 
manufacturing and production is worth $7.4 billion;88 and an exclu-
sion for federal subsidies paid to employers that provide a prescrip-
tion-drug plan for Medicare-eligible employees is worth $1.1 bil-
lion.89 Insurance companies are entitled to various preferences that 
sum to over $7 billion,90 and the construction industry enjoys, 
among other preferences, a tax credit for developing low-income 
housing worth $5.5 billion.91 The list, of course, goes on, providing 
something like an honor roll for corporate lobbyists. The total 
value of the various tax preferences for corporations engaged in 
different industries and businesses in 2009 exceeds $118 billion92—
about 33% of the projected corporate income tax receipts for the 
government’s current fiscal year.93 But, importantly, not all corpo-
84 Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 110th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expen-
ditures for Fiscal Years 2008–2012, at 60 (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter Joint 
Committee Tax Expenditures Estimates].  
85 Id. at 60, 69. The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation no longer classifies de-
ferral for active income of controlled foreign corporations or deferral for active fi-
nancing income as a tax expenditure. Id. at 69. 
86 Id. at 60–63. 
87 Id. at 69. Again, the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation no longer classifies 
this item as a tax expenditure. Id. 
88 Id. at 66. See also Treasury Background Paper, supra note 16, at 5. 
89 Joint Committee Tax Expenditures Estimates, supra note 84, at 57. 
90 Id. at 64–65. 
91 Id. at 65. 
92 Id. at 50–69. 
93 Cong. Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 to 
2018, at 83 (2008) (projecting corporate income tax revenues of $356 billion for fiscal 
year 2009). 
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rations benefit equally. Each preference is limited by its terms to 
corporations engaged in a particular industry or activity.94 
Similarly, debt financing and tax shelters also create unevenness 
in the corporate-level tax. Interest payments can be deducted for 
corporate tax purposes, but different corporations rely differently 
on debt financing,95 reflecting variance in creditworthiness and tol-
erance for insolvency risk. Those managers who are able and will-
ing to borrow more heavily can effect greater reductions in their 
corporate-level tax burden. Different managers also have different 
propensities to enter into structured tax-avoidance transactions—
tax shelters—as a means for reducing the corporate-level tax bur-
den.96 
The unevenness resulting from the different use of corporate tax 
preferences, interest deductions, and tax shelters shows up in effec-
tive tax rates and marginal effective tax rates. A study covering 
large corporations in the years 2004 through 2006 found that effec-
tive tax rates, averaged over that three-year period, ranged from a 
low of 10.2% to a high of 43.6%, with a median of 30%.97 Of the 
eighty corporations included in the study, five had effective tax 
rates under 20%, thirty-six had effective tax rates of at least 20% 
but under 30%, thirty-six had effective tax rates of at least 30% but 
under 40%, and three had effective tax rates of at least 40%.98  A 
separate study covering the years 1995 to 2000 (which used a dif-
ferent methodology) found less extensive but still significant diver-
gence among effective corporate tax rates.99 
94 Treasury Background Paper, supra note 16, at 2. 
95 See, e.g., Pechman, supra note 8, at 184. 
96 See generally U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters: 
Discussion, Analysis and Legislative Proposals (1999). 
97 See Martin A. Sullivan, Reported Corporate Effective Tax Rates Down Since 
Late 1990s, 118 Tax Notes 882, 885–86 (2008). An effective corporate tax rate is the 
corporate tax expense divided by corporate pre-tax income. See George K. Yin, How 
Much Tax Do Large Public Corporations Pay?: Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of 
the S&P 500, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1793, 1795 (2003). 
98 Sullivan, supra note 97, at 885–86. 
99 Yin, supra note 97, at 1830–50 (finding that effective corporate tax rates ranged 
from 25 to 30 percent). The variance in corporate effective tax rates has been the case 
for some time. See Martin, supra note 79, at 1213 (reporting divergent effective cor-
porate tax rates among different industries in 1980 and 1981). Arlen and Weiss also 
note that “the incidence of preferences varies widely between corporations” and that 
“[t]he uneven distribution of preferences means that different sectors face different 
DORAN_BOOK 4/15/2009 11:44 AM 
540 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 95:517 
 
Similarly, there is a broad range of marginal effective tax rates in 
the corporate sector.100 As calculated by the Treasury Department 
in 2007, the overall marginal effective tax rate for equity-financed 
investments was 39.7%; the overall marginal effective tax rate for 
debt-financed investments was negative 2.2%.101 As calculated by 
the Congressional Budget Office in 2003, the marginal effective 
corporate tax rate for equity-financed investment in industrial 
structures was 41.0%, but the rate for equity-financed investment 
in machinery was only 23.6%.102 By comparison, the marginal effec-
tive corporate tax rate for debt-financed investments in machinery 
was negative 45.9%.103 And, as calculated by the Congressional 
Budget Office in 2002, the marginal effective corporate tax rates on 
other investments ranged from a low of 9.2% for “petroleum and 
natural-gas structures” to a high of 36.9% for “computers and pe-
ripheral equipment”;104 the rate was 30.4% for commercial build-
ings, 22.7% for farm tractors, 20.1% for railroads, 17.8% for com-
munications equipment, 16.7% for construction machinery, and 
14.5% for aircraft.105 
These differences in effective tax rates and marginal effective tax 
rates are significant for managers’ decisions about whether and 
how to lobby on integration. Because of differences in effective 
rates, certain corporations “are granted full or partial relief from 
effective tax rates.” Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 357. However, they regard the 
variance in corporate tax rates as bearing primarily on the retained-earnings trap. Id. 
at 357–59. In other words, they apparently do not consider the variance in corporate 
effective tax rates as having significance in determining manager lobbying positions 
on integration apart from the limited point that “a few” managers “oppose integra-
tion because of the retained earnings trap.” Id. at 358. 
100 A marginal effective tax rate is “a hypothetical tax rate that, if applied to prop-
erly measured income, would have the same incentive effect as [that] implied by the 
various . . . features of the actual tax code.” Treasury Background Paper, supra note 
16, at 23. 
101 Office of Tax Policy, supra note 14, at 82. 
102 Cong. Budget Office, Corporate Income Tax Rates: International Comparisons 
35, 41 (2005); see also Martin, supra note 79, at 29 (“The corporate tax system skewed 
investment from structures to equipment: income generated by structures is taxed at 
roughly 30 percent; that of equipment, at approximately 20 percent.”). 
103 Cong. Budget Office, supra note 102, at 44. 
104 Cong. Budget Office, Taxing Capital Income: Effective Rates and Approaches to 
Reform 10–11 (2005) (providing 2002 data). 
105 Id. 
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corporate level tax”;106 others are not. All else equal, managers of 
corporations with low tax burdens should not consider integration 
to be as attractive as their counterparts at corporations with high 
tax burdens. Indeed, managers at low-tax corporations may want to 
resist integration if they anticipate that eliminating the double tax 
would level the playing field in effective tax rates among corpora-
tions.107 The intuition here is straightforward. Because the double 
tax generally applies to all corporations that issue equity in the 
public securities markets, the managers of the corporations subject 
to the double tax are competing with each other for investment 
capital. This competition cuts across industries: a company in one 
sector must compete for investment capital with a company in a 
different sector, even though those two companies do not compete 
with each other in the sale of their products and services. 
In seeking investment capital, relative effective tax rates matter 
a great deal because the relative effective tax rates affect the after-
tax rates of return offered to investors. Managers of companies 
with low effective tax rates enjoy lower costs of equity capital and, 
as a result, greater opportunities for corporate expansion. Thus, it 
is entirely rational for managers of low-tax corporations to prefer 
the status quo—that is, to prefer the double taxation of corporate 
profits—over any change to the double tax that would have the ef-
fect of leveling corporate effective tax rates. These managers ra-
tionally should prefer a system of double taxation that imposes 
high relative tax rates on other corporations to a system of integra-
tion, even if the integrated system would reduce all corporate ef-
fective tax rates in absolute terms.108 Managers at high-tax corpora-
106 Treasury Background Paper, supra note 16, at 4. 
107 Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 341 (“Corporate managers prefer to lobby on be-
half of provisions that help only their firms or industries.”); see also Martin, supra 
note 79, at 114–16 (providing examples of corporations lobbying for provisions that 
benefit their firms or industries). Arlen and Weiss maintain that tax preferences such 
as accelerated depreciation “can be targeted to specific industries” but that 
“[i]ntegration affects all firms.” Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 341. The first point is 
certainly valid: corporate tax preferences do affect different firms differently. But the 
implication of the second point is the question at issue: indeed, it is in part because of 
the uneven effects of corporate tax preferences that integration also affects firms dif-
ferently. 
108 See Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 2, at 927 (“A tax can be beneficial to 
some private producers if it strikes their competitors even harder.”). 
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tions, of course, should have precisely the opposite disposition: 
they should prefer a leveling of effective tax rates through integra-
tion to the continuation of uneven effective tax rates under the 
status quo.109 
The unevenness of the corporate-level tax affects collateral in-
terests as well. A tax preference intended to induce a corporation 
to make a particular type of investment often benefits the industry 
in which the investment is made. The low-income housing tax 
credit, for example, increases the aggregate amount invested in af-
fordable housing and, by extension, benefits both the non-
corporate construction firms that build the housing and the lower-
income families who live in it. Those collateral interests have a 
stake in the corporate double tax even though they are neither 
managers nor shareholders. Any repeal or reduction in the value of 
a corporate tax preference—for example, through elimination of 
the corporate-level tax—could significantly affect those collateral 
interests. In certain cases, their stake in the continuation of corpo-
rate tax preferences may even be greater than that of managers: if 
the incidence of corporate tax preferences shifts to third parties, 
those third parties would bear the burden of losing those prefer-
ences. There is every reason to suppose that these collateral inter-
ests would participate actively in any integration proposal that 
might strengthen or weaken corporate tax preferences. 
2. Shareholders and Collateral Interests 
The second level of the double tax also applies unevenly. Again, 
the baseline is relatively straightforward. Any corporate profits dis-
tributed to shareholders as dividends are taxed to the shareholders. 
Historically, ordinary-income rates applied; currently, capital-gains 
rates apply. Any retained corporate profits remain untaxed until 
shareholders sell their stock; at that point, capital-gains rates apply. 
The tax law, however, creates substantial departures from this 
baseline, including the complete elimination of the shareholder-
level tax for a large number of shareholders. 
At least twenty-five percent of corporate equity is held by 
shareholders that are exempt from federal income tax. As of the 
109 See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 342 (noting that managers of corporations 
with low use of corporate tax preferences may “actively support integration”). 
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third quarter of 2008, the total value of outstanding corporate eq-
uity is $19.6 trillion.110 Of this, $3.8 trillion (19% of the total)111 is 
held directly by private and government retirement plans; these 
plans are completely exempt from tax.112 Mutual funds hold $4.1 
trillion of corporate equity (21% of the total),113 and 25% of mutual 
fund shares in turn are owned by private and government retire-
ment plans.114 Another $97.4 billion of corporate equity (about 
0.5% of the total),115 is held by state and local governments; these 
also are exempt from tax. Thus, even without counting the corpo-
rate shares held by tax-exempt foundations, charities, universities, 
and similar organizations, 25 out of every 100 dollars of corporate 
equity is owned by shareholders who pay no income tax on divi-
dends or on gains from the sale of their stock.116 
A large amount of corporate equity is held by other corpora-
tions. Financial services companies (exclusive of mutual funds) 
hold $1.45 trillion in corporate stock (about 7% of the total).117 
Outside the financial services industry, many public companies 
own stock in other companies, whether those other companies are 
themselves publicly traded or are part of a controlled group of par-
ent and subsidiaries. Dividends received by a corporation are sub-
ject to a 70% dividend-received deduction that effectively reduces 
the tax rate on such dividends to 10.5%.118 The amount of the de-
110 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Flow of Funds Accounts of the United 
States: Flows and Outstandings Third Quarter 2008, at 90 tbl.L.213 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Board of Governors]. This figure includes the value of stock in U.S. companies 
held by foreign persons and the value of stock in foreign companies held by U.S. per-
sons; it excludes inter-corporate holdings by companies outside the financial sector. 
Id. 
111 Id. 
112 I.R.C. § 501(a), (c) (West 2008). 
113 Board of Governors, supra note 110, at 90 tbl.L.213. 
114 Id. at 90 tbl.L.214. 
115 Id. at 90 tbl.L.213. 
116 The 25% number is potentially several percentage points too low. See, e.g., 
Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 67 (indicating that tax-exempt share-
holders own approximately 37% of directly held corporate equity). One analysis con-
cluded that in 2000 only 46% of corporate dividends were taxable at the shareholder 
level. William G. Gale, About Half of Dividend Payments Do Not Face Double Taxa-
tion, 97 Tax Notes 839 (2002). 
117 Board of Governors, supra note 110, at 90 tbl.L.213. 
118 I.R.C. § 243 (West 2008). 
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duction increases for higher shareholdings: once the shareholding 
corporation owns at least 80% of another corporation, the divi-
dends-received deduction generally increases to 100%, eliminating 
any shareholder-level tax on dividends.119 Finally, approximately 
11% of the value of corporate equity is held by foreign investors.120 
As a default rule, dividends received by foreign shareholders are 
taxed at a flat withholding rate of 30%.121 However, this rate gener-
ally is lowered under bilateral tax treaties. For example, under the 
treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, divi-
dends paid by U.S. companies to U.K. taxpayers generally are tax-
able by the U.S. at a rate of 15%.122 
Ignoring foreign shareholders, the shareholder-level taxes on 
corporate profits are as shown in Table 1. The first and second 
rows in Table 1 cover corporate profits attributable to equity; the 
third row, included for comparison, covers corporate profits attrib-
utable to debt. As Table 1 demonstrates, the second level of the 
double tax on profits distributed as dividends actually applies only 
in the case of a taxable non-corporate shareholder; for a tax-
exempt shareholder or a corporate shareholder, the second level of 
the double tax on such profits is either eliminated or reduced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
119 Id. §§ 243, 1504(a) (West 2008). For 2004, only $51 billion of the $274 billion in 
dividends received by corporate shareholders was subject to the double tax; the re-
maining $223 billion in dividends was covered by dividends-received deductions and 
foreign tax credits. Office of Tax Policy, supra note 14, at 78. 
120 Board of Governors, supra note 110, at 90 tbl.L.213. 
121 I.R.C. § 871(a) (West 2008). 
122 See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., art. 
10, § 2, July 24, 2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 107-19 (2002).  
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Table 1 
Investor-Level Taxes on Corporate Profits 
 
 
Taxable  
Non-Corporate  
Investor 
Taxable  
Corporate  
Investor 
Tax-Exempt 
Investor 
Corporate Profit 
Distributed as  
Dividend 
Taxable 
(at Capital-Gains 
Rate) 
Deductible 
(70% to 100%) 
Not Taxable 
Corporate Profit 
Realized on Stock 
Sale 
Taxable 
(at Capital-Gains 
Rate) 
Taxable Not Taxable 
Corporate Profit 
Distributed as Interest 
Taxable 
(at Ordinary-Income 
Rate) 
Taxable Not Taxable 
The elimination and reduction of shareholder-level tax for tax-
exempt and corporate shareholders do not require that the distrib-
uting corporation have paid any corporate-level tax on the 
amounts distributed. Thus, if a corporation earns income that is 
covered by a corporate tax preference, such as a special exclusion 
or deduction, and distributes that income as a dividend to a tax-
exempt or corporate shareholder, there may be no tax imposed at 
either level. This is shown in Table 2, which sets out the combined 
corporate-level and shareholder-level taxes on $100 of corporate 
business profits. The first two rows show the results for profits dis-
tributed as dividends (the last two rows, which show the results for 
profits distributed as interest, are included for comparison). If the 
double tax were fully imposed on the $100, the corporate-level tax 
would be $35, and the shareholder-level tax would be $9.75 ($22.75 
in the case of a corporate shareholder) for a total tax of $44.75 
($57.75 in the case of a corporate shareholder). Because of the 
combination of corporate-level preferences and shareholder-level 
exemptions and deductions, however, full double taxation actually 
occurs only in the case of dividends paid out of non-preference in-
come to taxable non-corporate shareholders. All other dividends 
are taxed only once or not at all. 
 
 
 
DORAN_BOOK 4/15/2009 11:44 AM 
546 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 95:517 
 
Table 2 
Combined Corporate-Level and Investor-Level Taxes on $100 of 
Corporate Income 
 
 
  
Taxable  
Non-Corporate 
Investor 
Taxable  
Corporate  
Investor 
Tax-Exempt 
Investor 
Non-Preference Income  
Distributed as Dividend $44.75 $35 $35  
Preference Income  
Distributed as Dividend $15 $0 $0  
Non-Preference Income  
Distributed as Interest $35 $35 $0  
Preference Income  
Distributed as Interest $35 $35 $0  
Assumptions: Corporate tax rate is 35%; individual tax rate for ordinary in-
come is 35%; individual tax rate for capital gains is 15%; corporate tax pref-
erence provides for full exclusion or deduction; corporate shareholder enti-
tled to 100% dividends-received deduction. 
 
It would be a mistake, then, to conclude that double taxation 
represents the norm in the taxation of corporate profits. Just as the 
corporate-level tax is made uneven by corporate tax preferences, 
interest deductions, and tax shelters, the shareholder-level tax is 
made uneven by exemptions and dividends-received deductions. 
This creates different, and potentially inconsistent, interests among 
shareholders. There is little reason to suppose that all shareholders 
would want the same outcome if integration legislation were in 
play. 
Additionally, there are important collateral interests on the 
shareholder side that could be affected by the reduction or elimina-
tion of the double tax. For example, tax-qualified retirement plans 
are themselves investment vehicles for employees. The tax-exempt 
status of these plans allows employees to shelter income, including 
corporate dividends, from the income tax: all else equal, an em-
ployee generally will have a higher post-tax return by holding divi-
dend-paying corporate stock in a tax-qualified retirement plan 
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rather than by holding it directly. But the advantage is relative; if 
there were no shareholder-level tax on dividends paid by stock 
held outside a plan, there would be no tax justification for holding 
the stock inside the plan.123 The employee, moreover, is not the 
only one who benefits from the arrangement: investment manag-
ers, trustees, actuaries, accountants, record-keepers, and other con-
sultants receive fees from tax-qualified retirement plans and the 
employers that sponsor the plans. In some cases—for example, a 
pension plan actuary or record-keeper—the consultant’s entire 
business consists of providing services to tax-qualified retirement 
plans. Because the plan itself is effectively a tax shelter from the 
individual income tax, including the shareholder-level tax on divi-
dends, these consultants may have a strong interest in the continua-
tion of the double tax. Similar considerations arise for third parties 
such as life insurance companies, bond dealers, and realtors be-
cause of the relative tax advantages for investments in annuity con-
tracts, tax-exempt bonds, and real estate. 
By contrast, there are other collateral interests that may benefit 
from eliminating the double tax. Certain brokerage firms, mutual 
funds, and other investment firms, for example, would potentially 
increase their business if individuals and other taxable investors 
shift their portfolios toward corporate stock. These and other col-
lateral interests on the shareholder side reasonably may see them-
selves as having stakes in integration that are important enough to 
justify joining the lobbying fray. 
3. Integration Models 
Policymakers and academics have developed a remarkable vari-
ety of integration models.124 Under simplifying assumptions (includ-
123 See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Commentary, Will Integration Increase Efficiency?—
The Old and New View of Dividend Policy, 47 Tax L. Rev. 645, 646 (1992) 
(“[I]ntegration might have a significant impact on tax-exempt organizations . . . par-
ticularly for the establishment of pension plans.”). 
124 A note on terminology: the term “integration” (or “full integration”) is often 
used to refer precisely to pass-through taxation of business income earned by corpo-
rations. See, e.g., Emil M. Sunley, Corporate Integration: An Economic Perspective, 
47 Tax L. Rev. 621, 624 (1992).  The term is also used, however, to refer more broadly 
to the elimination of the taxation of corporate profits distributed as dividends (“par-
tial integration”). Id. To confuse matters a bit further, George Yin has suggested a 
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ing equivalent corporate and shareholder tax rates), the models 
produce equivalent outcomes,125 but they have widely differential 
effects once relevant tax differences are taken into account. An 
overview of several integration models grounds the basic equiva-
lence: 
A shareholder-allocation model attributes corporate income di-
rectly to shareholders. It preserves the corporate tax but gives 
shareholders a credit for that tax.126 Shareholders increase basis in 
their shares for the corporate income allocated to them, and they 
treat corporate distributions first as a return of basis and then as 
capital gains. 
Example: Assume that the corporate and shareholder tax rates 
are 35% and that Corporation X, which is owned entirely by 
Shareholder Y, earns $100 of taxable income.127 Under the share-
holder-allocation model, Corporation X pays $35 tax on the $100 
income, and Shareholder Y is treated as having $100 of income. 
Shareholder Y owes $35 of tax and claims a $35 credit for the tax 
paid by Corporation X. If Corporation X later distributes $65 to 
Shareholder Y, Shareholder Y excludes that $65 from income and 
nets $65. 
A mark-to-market model taxes shareholders on the sum of the 
annual increase in the value of their shares and any dividends dis-
method for achieving integration through double taxation. George K. Yin, Corporate 
Tax Integration and the Search for the Pragmatic Ideal, 47 Tax L. Rev. 431, 480–501 
(1992). In this Article, the term “integration” is used in the broad sense to refer to the 
elimination of the corporate double tax. Cf. Warren, supra note 7, at 739 (using the 
term “integration” to refer “to the elimination of corporate taxes on distributed cor-
porate earnings”). 
125 Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 61; cf. Warren, supra note 7, at 
775–77 (demonstrating that the shareholder credit and dividend deduction integration 
methods have equivalent effects). 
126 See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 27–29; Treasury Blueprints, 
supra note 40, at 69; George F. Break & Joseph A. Pechman, Federal Tax Reform: 
The Impossible Dream? 101–03 (1975); Pechman, supra note 8, at 185–86 (describing 
it as full integration or the “partnership method”); Dodge, supra note 40, at 279–81 
(describing it as full integration or the “pass-through” model); Polito, supra note 40, 
at 1030. It would also be possible to structure shareholder-allocation integration such 
that no tax was collected at the corporate level. See, e.g., McLure, supra note 40, at 
549–50; Yin, supra note 124, at 433–36. Prominent versions of the shareholder-
allocation model, however, would retain the corporate tax for purposes of collecting 
the shareholder-level tax. See, e.g., Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 27. 
127 Except where otherwise stated, these assumptions apply throughout the examples 
discussed in the remainder of this overview. 
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tributed to them.128 The model generally does not require a deter-
mination of corporate-level income, and it permits elimination of 
the corporate-level tax. 
Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes nothing to 
Shareholder Y. At the end of the year, the market value of the 
Corporation X stock has increased by $100, and Shareholder Y in-
cludes that $100 in income. Shareholder Y pays $35 tax and adjusts 
basis upward by $100. If Corporation X later distributes $100 to 
Shareholder Y, Shareholder Y excludes the $100 from income and 
(taking into account the $35 tax already paid by Shareholder Y) 
nets $65.129 
A dividend-deduction model leaves both the corporate-level and 
shareholder-level taxes in place but gives the corporation a deduc-
tion for dividends paid to shareholders.130 
Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes the entire 
amount as a dividend to Shareholder Y. Corporation X pays tax of 
$0 ($100 income minus $100 deduction); Shareholder Y pays $35 of 
tax and nets $65. 
A split-rate model taxes distributed corporate income at a rate 
lower than the rate for retained corporate income.131 If the rate for 
distributed income is zero, the split-rate model is the same as the 
dividend-deduction model. 
Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes the entire 
amount as a dividend to Shareholder Y. Corporation X pays tax of 
$0 ($100 of distributed income, taxable at a rate of 0%); Share-
holder Y pays $35 of tax and nets $65. 
A dividend-exclusion model preserves the corporate-level tax 
but eliminates the shareholder-level tax for dividends.132 
128 See Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 47; Abrams & Doernberg, 
supra note 3, at 11; Dodge, supra note 40, at 309–11; Taylor, supra note 40, at 298–
310. 
129 This ignores the time value of money. 
130 See Warren, supra note 7, at 745–46, 774; see also Treasury II, supra note 40, at 
122 (proposing partial dividend deduction); Treasury I, supra note 40, at 136 (same); 
Andrews ALI Supplemental Study, supra note 40, at 3, 88–89 (proposing deduction 
for certain dividends on new equity); Andrews ALI Study, supra note 40, at 328, 366–
70 (same).  
131 See Pechman, supra note 8, at 184; Warren, supra note 7, at 775. 
132 See Advisory Panel Report, supra note 40, at 124–25; Treasury Integration Re-
port, supra note 40, at 17–18; Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 47; 
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Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes its after-tax 
profits to Shareholder Y. Corporation X pays $35 in tax and dis-
tributes $65 to Shareholder Y. Shareholder Y excludes the $65 
from gross income and nets $65. 
An imputation-credit model preserves the corporate-level tax but 
converts it to a withholding mechanism for the shareholder-level 
tax.133 The includable amount of any dividend is increased 
(“grossed up”) by the corporate-level tax attributable to the 
amount distributed; the shareholders claim a credit for the corpo-
rate-level tax. 
Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes its after-tax 
profits to Shareholder Y. Corporation X pays tax of $35 and dis-
tributes $65. Shareholder Y includes $100 in gross income (the $65 
actually distributed and a $35 gross up), owes $35 tax on the distri-
bution, and claims a $35 credit. Shareholder Y nets $65. 
A comprehensive business income tax model eliminates the tax 
distinction between corporate and non-corporate businesses.134 
Every business pays an entity-level tax on its taxable income, which 
generally is calculated in the same manner as corporate taxable in-
come but without any deduction for interest payments. Sharehold-
ers and creditors exclude all distributions, whether characterized as 
dividends or interest.135 
Example: Corporation X earns $100 and distributes its after-tax 
profits to Shareholder Y. Corporation X pays tax of $35 and dis-
tributes $65. Shareholder Y excludes the $65 distribution from in-
come and nets $65. 
Table 3 summarizes the equivalent effects of these integration 
models under simplified assumptions. As the table indicates, each 
model yields combined corporate-level and shareholder-level taxes 
Break & Pechman, supra note 126, at 97–98; Pechman, supra note 8, at 184–85; Peel, 
supra note 40, at 13–14. 
133 See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 95; Treasury Option Papers, 
supra note 40, at 49–50; Break & Pechman, supra note 126, at 99–100; Pechman, supra 
note 8, at 184; Warren, supra note 7, at 744–45, 773–74. 
134 See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 39–40; cf. Advisory Panel Re-
port, supra note 40, at 162 (proposing a “flat 30 percent tax on all businesses other 
than sole proprietorships, regardless of their legal structure”). 
135 In this way, the comprehensive business income tax would not simply integrate 
the corporate-level and shareholder-level taxes, it also would fundamentally alter the 
tax treatment of non-corporate businesses. 
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of $35 on business income of $100, netting $65 for the shareholder. 
This compares to combined taxes of $57.75 and a net of $42.25 un-
der the corporate double tax for non-corporate shareholders re-
ceiving a dividend from $100 of corporate earnings not subject to 
any tax preferences. Although important as a baseline, this equiva-
lence among the integration models is misleading, and it breaks 
down once the analysis accounts for relevant tax differences among 
corporations and among shareholders. 
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Assumptions: Corporate tax rate is 35% (but 0% under shareholder-
allocation and mark-to-market methods and for income distributed as divi-
dends under split-rate method); individual tax rate is 35%; no portion of the 
$100 constitutes preference income. Additionally, both the time value of 
money and any benefits of deferring dividends are ignored.  
a. Differential Effects at the Corporate Level 
Integration models have differing effects on high-tax and low-tax 
corporations. As explained above, variance in corporate effective 
tax rates follows from different utilizations of corporate tax prefer-
ences, debt financing, and tax shelters. Certain integration models 
narrow that variance, but others do not. Managers of low-tax cor-
porations rationally may support integration proposals that would 
not even out effective tax rates but oppose integration proposals 
that would; managers of high-tax corporations rationally may line 
up the other way. 
Consider how different integration models would affect corpo-
rate tax preferences, a principal source of unevenness in corporate 
effective tax rates. The basic question here is whether integration 
should pass the benefit of a corporate tax preference through to 
shareholders. Perfectly sound policy arguments have been made on 
both sides. If the object of integration is to treat shareholders as 
though they had earned the corporation’s business income directly, 
preferences should pass through;136 if instead the object is to tax 
corporate business profits exactly once, preferences should not 
pass through.137 The point could even be resolved on a preference-
by-preference basis.138 
Different integration models imply different outcomes for cor-
porate tax preferences. The dividend-deduction model does not 
136 Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 59; Warren, supra note 7, at 
777–78. 
137 Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 64; Warren ALI Integration Study, 
supra note 40, at 60; Warren, supra note 7, at 778. 
138 See Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 63–64, 108–12. For a discus-
sion of how other tax systems have addressed the problem of tax preferences and in-
tegration, see generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Treatment of Corporate Prefer-
ence Items under an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative Analysis, 44 Tax Law. 
195 (1990). 
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pass through preferences.139 By contrast, the shareholder-allocation 
integration model strongly implies that pass-through is appropriate 
because the model is premised on the idea that shareholders 
should be treated as standing in the place of the corporation.140 The 
mark-to-market model—which is conceptually similar to the 
shareholder-allocation model—eliminates the need to calculate 
taxable income at the corporate level. In turn, that eliminates the 
calculation of corporate tax preferences.141 Other models are more 
flexible. Allowing shareholders to exclude all dividends under the 
dividend-exclusion model passes corporate-level tax preferences 
through to shareholders;142 not allowing an exclusion for dividends 
attributable to income not taxed at the corporate level has the op-
posite effect.143 
Table 4 illustrates the significance of the pass-through question. 
Under the double tax, a corporation with $100 of business profits 
that can be excluded at the corporate level by reason of a tax pref-
erence pays no corporate-level tax; the corporation distributes the 
entire $100 to its shareholder who nets $65 after paying the share-
holder-level tax of $35 (see Column B). By contrast, a corporation 
with $100 of non-preference (fully taxable) income distributes an 
after-tax amount of only $65, netting $42.25 to the shareholder (see 
Column A). The corporation with preference income provides a 
higher after-tax return to its shareholder than does the corporation 
with non-preference income. That advantage is maintained under 
139 Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 186. 
140 Id. at 30. Also, it might not even be practicable under this model not to pass pref-
erences through. In the Treasury Integration Report, the Treasury Department noted 
that attempts to prevent pass-through of preferences under this method were “diffi-
cult and inconsistent with the passthrough nature” of shareholder allocation. Id. 
141 Dodge, supra note 40, at 303–04. Although it would be possible under the mark-
to-market model to track corporate taxable income so that preferences could be 
passed through to shareholders, doing so would leave little reason to consider the 
model as a distinct form of integration. 
142 See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 17–19, 64, 186. Thus, if a cor-
poration earns $100 of profits that it can exclude from its income by reason of a tax 
preference and then distributes that $100 to its shareholders, exclusion of the $100 
dividend by the shareholders results in no taxation of those profits at either the cor-
porate or shareholder level. 
143 The imputation-credit method also can be used to pass through, or not pass 
through, tax preferences. See Warren, supra note 7, at 778–84; Treasury Option Pa-
pers, supra note 40, at 49 (describing proposal for imputation-credit integration that 
would pass investment tax credit through to shareholders). 
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integration (shown in Table 4 using the dividend-exclusion 
method) as long as preferences are passed through. With pass-
through, the corporation with $100 of preference income returns a 
net of $100 to its shareholder (see Column D), but the corporation 
with no preference income returns a net of only $65 to its share-
holder (see Column C). Without pass-through, both corporations 
return only $65 to their shareholders (see Columns F and E). Thus, 
passing preferences through under integration preserves the rela-
tive advantage of the corporation with preference income; that 
corporation continues to provide a higher rate of return to its 
shareholder than a corporation with non-preference income and, 
accordingly, continues to benefit from a lower cost of capital. Not 
passing preferences through fundamentally alters the relative posi-
tions of the two corporations. 
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Table 4 
Effects of Pass-Through of Corporate Tax Preferences 
  
A  
 
Double 
Tax  
(Current 
Law)  
 
Corpora-
tion with 
No Pref-
erence  
Income  
B  
 
Double 
Tax 
(Current 
Law)  
 
Corpora-
tion with 
Prefer-
ence In-
come  
C  
 
Dividend  
Exclusion  
 
 
 
Pass-
Through  
Corpora-
tion with 
No  
Preference  
Income  
D  
 
Dividend  
Exclusion  
 
 
 
Pass-
Through  
Corpora-
tion with 
Preference 
Income 
E  
 
Dividend  
Exclusion  
 
 
 
No Pass-
Through  
Corpora-
tion with 
No  
Preference 
Income  
F  
 
Dividend  
Exclusion    
 
 
 
No Pass-
Through  
Corpora-
tion with 
Preference 
Income  
Corporate 
 Income  
(Preference) 
0 100 0 100 0 100 
Corporate 
Tax  
(Non-
Preference) 
100 0 100 0 100 0 
Corporate 
Tax  
 
35 0 35 0 35 0 
Dividend 
 
 
65 100 65 100 65 100 
Shareholder  
Income 
 
65 100 0 0 0 100 
Shareholder 
Tax 
 
22.75 35 0 0 0 35 
Total Taxes 
 
57.75 35 35 0 35 35 
Net to  
Shareholder  
 
42.25 65 65 100 65 65 
 
Assumptions: Corporate tax rate is 35%; individual tax rate is 35%; prefer-
ence income is entirely excludable; all shareholders are individuals. 
 
The treatment of tax preferences under integration should pre-
sent a genuine concern for managers. All else equal, corporations 
with greater utilization of corporate tax preferences have lower ef-
fective tax rates; all else equal, corporations with lower effective 
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tax rates have lower costs of capital. Passing through corporate tax 
preferences under integration maintains these uneven results; that 
should make integration attractive to managers of low-tax corpora-
tions and unattractive to managers of high-tax corporations. Not 
passing preferences through evens out the results; that should ap-
peal to managers of high-tax corporations (especially to those who 
have tried unsuccessfully to secure tax preferences through the leg-
islative process) but not to managers of low-tax corporations. If a 
particular legislative proposal were pre-committed on the pass-
through question—for example, if it were a proposal under the 
shareholder-allocation model, which automatically passes prefer-
ences through to shareholders—that point alone might divide 
managers. If instead the proposal put the pass-through question in 
play—for example, if it were a proposal under the imputation-
credit model, which readily accommodates passing or not passing 
preferences through to shareholders—the lobbying decisions of 
managers might be more complex and might lead to contingent 
support or opposition. It is not plausible, however, that managers 
of corporations that are relative winners or losers under the corpo-
rate double tax would be indifferent to how integration would af-
fect their effective tax rates relative to the effective tax rates of 
other companies with which they must compete for equity capital. 
As the agency-cost explanation argues, different managers may 
have different dispositions toward the retained-earnings trap. Al-
though the various integration models generally would remove the 
trap, certain models would simply remove the bias in favor of re-
taining earnings while others would create a new bias in favor of 
distributing earnings. The latter possibility is particularly likely in 
the case of models that condition integration on the distribution of 
earnings, such as the dividend-deduction, split-rate, dividend-
exclusion, and imputation-credit models. By contrast, the share-
holder-allocation and mark-to-market models would eliminate the 
double tax without regard to whether the corporation distributes 
profits. This difference potentially splits the interests of managers: 
the managers of corporations that pay regular dividends should 
prefer the distribution-dependent models over the other models; 
managers of corporations that retain their profits should (as the 
agency-cost explanation argues) oppose integration or, perhaps as 
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a fallback, support integration only if it does not require distribu-
tions. To complicate the issue, the distribution-dependent integra-
tion models generally can be modified to extend the benefits of in-
tegration to retained earnings through a dividend reinvestment 
plan (“DRIP”).144 In the case of the dividend-exclusion model, for 
example, a DRIP would allow the shareholder of a corporation 
that retains its earnings to increase her basis, thereby reducing her 
gain when she sells her stock.145 That removes the bias in favor of 
distributing earnings, although it does not restore the bias in favor 
of retaining earnings. Thus, the different integration models—and 
variations on the different integration models—likely will appeal 
differently to managers of corporations that distribute earnings and 
managers of corporations that retain earnings. 
In combination, these considerations may present managers with 
complex decisions about whether to lobby on a particular integra-
tion proposal and, if so, what position to take. The anticipated con-
sequences for effective tax rates, the treatment of corporate tax 
preferences, and the possibility of a bias for the distribution of 
earnings should be of concern to managers, but those factors may 
differ significantly from one specific proposal to another and, 
within the four corners of any one proposal, may be subject to 
modification during the legislative process. No doubt, managers 
must also consider the likely responses of other managers. If a 
manager of a low-tax, earnings-retaining corporation generally 
would prefer that there not be integration, her decision about 
whether or how to lobby may be affected by her expectations 
about the lobbying decisions of managers at high-tax, dividend-
paying companies. 
Finally, different integration models would also have different 
effects on manager-side collateral interests; that, in turn, could 
cause such collateral interests to support integration under certain 
models but to oppose it under others. Consider, for example, a col-
lateral interest (such as a trade association for producers of alter-
native energy) that sells goods or services to corporations for which 
the corporations can claim a tax credit (such as a credit for invest-
144 Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 24, 87–88; see also Warren ALI 
Integration Study, supra note 40, at 116–17 (describing constructive dividend options). 
145 Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 83, 87–88. 
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ments in alternative energy). It should matter greatly to that collat-
eral interest whether the terms of a particular integration proposal 
preserve the value of the corporate-level credit. Integration under 
the mark-to-market model eliminates the calculation of corporate-
level taxes and thus nullifies the value of the credit. The collateral 
interest should strongly oppose mark-to-market integration. By 
contrast, the shareholder-allocation model passes corporate tax 
preferences through to shareholders, allowing shareholders to 
claim those preferences directly for tax purposes. The collateral in-
terest should strongly support integration on these terms. Depend-
ing on policy decisions, other models—such as the imputation-
credit model—may pass corporate tax preferences through, and, if 
they do, may pass them through in whole or only in part. The lob-
bying decision of the collateral interest plainly should include the 
effect that the particular integration proposal would have on the 
credit. 
b. Differential Effects at the Shareholder Level 
Different integration models also have different effects at the 
shareholder level. The most prominent example is the treatment of 
shareholders that are exempt from federal income tax. Because 
tax-exempt shareholders own at least 25% of outstanding corpo-
rate equity,146 they may have a strong desire to lobby on integra-
tion. For these shareholders, there are two relevant considerations: 
whether a particular integration proposal would increase or de-
crease the absolute tax burden on their stock investments; and 
whether a particular integration proposal would increase or de-
crease that tax burden relative to the tax burden on stock invest-
ments made by taxable shareholders. 
Table 5 illustrates these points. Corporate non-preference in-
come distributed to tax-exempt shareholders currently bears only 
the corporate-level tax, and corporate preference income distrib-
uted to tax-exempt shareholders currently bears no tax at all (see 
Column A). By contrast, corporate non-preference income distrib-
uted to taxable shareholders currently bears the double tax, and 
corporate preference income distributed to taxable shareholders 
146 See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
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currently bears the shareholder-level tax (see Column B). An inte-
gration model that eliminates the corporate-level tax—such as the 
dividend-deduction model—eliminates altogether the tax burden 
for dividends paid to tax-exempt shareholders when corporate 
non-preference income is distributed to these shareholders (see 
Column C).147 However, the elimination of the corporate-level tax 
leaves unchanged the position of tax-exempt shareholders relative 
to the position of taxable shareholders (see Column D).148 All else 
equal, tax-exempt shareholders could be expected to favor integra-
tion on those terms because it would leave those shareholders no 
worse off on either an absolute or a relative basis. 
By contrast, an integration model that eliminates the share-
holder-level tax—such as the dividend-exclusion method—makes 
tax-exempt shareholders worse off relative to taxable shareholders. 
Removal of the shareholder-level tax does not change the absolute 
treatment of tax-exempt shareholders (compare Column E to Col-
umn A).149 It does, however, improve the treatment of taxable 
shareholders relative to the double tax (compare Column F to 
Column B). Therefore, it also improves the treatment of taxable 
shareholders relative to tax-exempt shareholders.150 Many tax-
exempt shareholders, such as tax-qualified retirement plans and 
variable annuities sold by life insurance companies, are themselves 
investment vehicles for taxable shareholders. Undoing the relative 
tax advantage for these tax-exempt shareholders may impair their 
ability to attract and retain investments. All else equal, these tax-
exempt shareholders could be expected to oppose integration un-
der models that remove the shareholder-level tax, just as they 
could be expected to support integration that removes the corpo-
rate-level tax.151 
147 See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 70, 107, 186–87; Warren ALI 
Integration Study, supra note 40, at 161; Warren, supra note 7, at 774, 787–88. 
148 Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 187. 
149 Id. at 17, 70, 186. 
150 See Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 161–62. 
151 The agency-cost explanation argues that removing the shareholder-tax provides 
“little benefit” to tax-exempt shareholders. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 363–64 
n.155.  But that does not really capture the effect from the perspective of these share-
holders: it is not simply that eliminating the shareholder-level tax leaves their absolute 
tax position unchanged, it is that eliminating the shareholder-level tax makes their 
relative tax position considerably worse. 
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Table 5 
Comparison of Tax-Exempt and Taxable Shareholders under 
Double Tax and Integration 
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Level Tax 
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No Tax 
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Level Tax 
 
Assumptions: Preference income is entirely excludable; preferences do not 
pass through to shareholders; all shareholders are individuals. 
 
Under other integration models, the outcomes for tax-exempt 
shareholders depend on a further policy decision about whether to 
make shareholder-level credits fully or partially refundable. Both 
the shareholder-allocation and the imputation-credit models, for 
example, retain the corporate-level tax but give shareholders a 
credit for the taxes paid by the corporation. Tax-exempt share-
holders benefit from the credit only if it is refundable. A fully re-
fundable credit under these models replicates the effects of elimi-
nating the corporate-level tax: dividends paid to taxable 
shareholders bear the corporate-level tax, but dividends paid to 
tax-exempt shareholders bear neither the corporate-level nor 
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shareholder-level tax.152 A nonrefundable credit replicates the ef-
fects of eliminating the shareholder-level tax: dividends paid to 
taxable and tax-exempt shareholders both bear the corporate-level 
tax.153 Partially refundable credits produce results between these 
extremes. The interests and lobbying positions of tax-exempt 
shareholders under these types of integration models should be 
strongly affected by the prospects that the shareholder-level credit 
will be made refundable in whole or in part. 
The same point can be generalized for rate differences among 
taxable shareholders.154 Individual shareholders pay tax at different 
tax rates, and their tax rates need not line up with the corporate tax 
rate. The variance in tax rates implies that different integration 
models produce different outcomes among individual shareholders. 
Integration models that eliminate the corporate-level tax subject 
corporate profits to the various shareholder rates, whereas integra-
tion models that eliminate the shareholder-level tax subject corpo-
rate profits to the uniform corporate rate.155 And integration mod-
els that convert the corporate-level tax into a withholding 
mechanism for the shareholder-level tax subject corporate profits 
either to shareholder rates if the shareholder-level credit is refund-
able or to the corporate rate if the credit is nonrefundable.156 This 
implies that different individual shareholders may take different 
positions on integration. Higher-income shareholders may prefer, 
all else equal, the elimination of the shareholder-level tax when (as 
has ordinarily been the case but is not the case now) individual 
rates exceed the corporate rate. Lower-income shareholders may 
prefer, all else equal, the elimination of the corporate-level tax; in 
this respect, the interests of lower-income shareholders should 
align with those of tax-exempt shareholders.157 
152 Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 93, 187. 
153 Id. at 93, 95, 103, 187; Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 164–66; 
Warren, supra note 7, at 774. 
154 See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 185–86. 
155 See id. at 185; Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 10. 
156 See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 185–86. 
157 Although different integration models may also have differential effects on for-
eign shareholders, it seems unlikely that such shareholders generally would wield sub-
stantial lobbying influence in Congress. It may be, however, that integration models 
that subject corporate business profits to taxation at shareholder rates would reduce 
the use of corporate tax shelters. See generally Mark P. Gergen, How Corporate In-
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Different integration models also may affect collateral interests 
on the shareholder side differently. Consider two trade associa-
tions: one that represents service providers for tax-qualified re-
tirement plans and one that represents brokerage firms. A pro-
posal for integration that eliminates the shareholder-level tax—
such as the dividend-exclusion model—could be expected to cause 
individuals to shift investments away from tax-qualified plans. That 
should draw the opposition of the trade association representing 
plan service providers and the support of the trade association rep-
resenting brokerage firms. By contrast, an integration proposal 
that eliminates the corporate-level tax without affecting the share-
holder-level tax might not draw the strong support or opposition of 
either trade association. 
c. Differential Transition Effects 
Legislative proposals to integrate the corporate and individual 
income taxes present transition issues, and the resolution of those 
issues may have varied effects on different managers, different 
shareholders, and different collateral interests.158 The agency-cost 
explanation generally assumes that integration would apply to all 
corporate equity, producing a windfall increase in the value of 
shares held at the time of enactment.159 But that assumes away 
much of the complexity that transition issues present in the tax leg-
islative process. 
It is certainly possible that integration legislation would not 
grandfather stock investments made before enactment, thereby 
tegration Could Kill the Market for Corporate Tax Shelters, 61 Tax L. Rev. 145 
(2008). 
158 See generally Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 89–92; Daniel 
Shaviro, When Rules Change: An Economic and Political Analysis of Transition Re-
lief and Retroactivity 158–70 (2000) (analysis of potential transition issues under cor-
porate integration). 
159 Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 338. There are, of course, other possible transi-
tion effects. Holders of other financial instruments—such as corporate bonds—may 
suffer a windfall loss if investors respond to integration by selling bonds in order to 
buy stock. McLure & Surrey, supra note 78, at 178. And holders of stock in corpora-
tions that make extensive use of tax preferences may suffer a windfall loss if integra-
tion does not pass corporate tax preferences through to shareholders. Warren, supra 
note 7, at 778. 
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conferring the potential windfall transition gain that the agency-
cost explanation assumes.160 That outcome, however, is not inevita-
ble. If integration were to grandfather existing stock investments, 
shareholders would not experience any windfall gain.161 Alterna-
tively, integration could include a one-time tax on any windfall 
gains.162 That may encourage managers to favor integration and 
shareholders to be indifferent to integration (assuming this part of 
the agency-cost explanation were otherwise correct). And, of 
course, the plasticity of transition treatment allows legislators to 
buy off manager or shareholder interests otherwise opposed to in-
tegration. For example, an integration proposal that provokes op-
position from tax-exempt shareholders because it eliminates the 
shareholder-level tax might become more attractive (or at least less 
objectionable) to those shareholders if they were promised a sub-
stantial windfall transition gain. Or the absence of a windfall transi-
tion gain for taxable shareholders might be softened, for example, 
by a decision to pass corporate tax preferences through to them. 
Similar adjustments could make integration more or less appealing 
to managers as well. 
The transition issues are still more nuanced. Congress often 
mitigates transition gains and transition losses by delaying new 
rules, phasing them in over time, or grandfathering only select in-
vestments held by specified taxpayers.163 Any combination of those 
policy instruments would be available for integration legislation. 
160 See Warren ALI Integration Study, supra note 40, at 205–07. An effective date 
that does not distinguish between existing stock investments and new investments 
may cause the market value of existing investments to increase if the pre-enactment 
market value of the investments incorporates a discount for the double tax. As indi-
cated above, however, there is debate on that point. Thus, whether there would be 
such windfall transition gains and, if so, how large those gains would be, remains un-
certain. See Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 223 n.2. 
161 See Andrews ALI Supplemental Study, supra note 40, at 89–97. Cf. Treasury In-
tegration Report, supra note 40, at 90 (considering and rejecting grandfathering of 
existing stock investments as mechanism for eliminating windfall transition gains). 
162 See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Debt, Equity, and the Taxation of Corporate Cash 
Flows, in Debt, Taxes, and Corporate Restructuring 91, 115 (John B. Shoven & Joel 
Waldfogel eds., 1990). 
163 Shaviro, supra note 158, at 216–17; see also Treasury Integration Report, supra 
note 40, at 90 (recommending phase-in for integration in general and describing 
phase-in for the dividend-exclusion model); Warren ALI Integration Study, supra 
note 40, at 209–11 (recommending and describing phase-in for the imputation-credit 
model). 
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Congress could give tailored transition gains and losses to particu-
lar interests: it might, for example, want to allow the pass-through 
of certain tax preferences held by some corporations but deny 
pass-through in all other cases; it might want to give a windfall gain 
to existing investments held by certain taxable shareholders but not 
to existing investments held by other taxable shareholders or by 
tax-exempt shareholders; or it might want to treat all owners of ex-
isting investments the same but allow only a partial windfall in all 
cases. The precise terms of the transition treatment under integra-
tion are, if anything, more likely to be determined by the lobbying 
positions of affected parties than they are to be determinants of 
those positions. Legislators who favor or oppose integration will 
use transition relief as currency for buying and selling support for 
the legislation.164 
In short, one cannot assume that straightforward and predeter-
mined transition effects will drive the lobbying positions of either 
managers or shareholders on integration. It may be that integration 
legislation would confer windfall gains on shareholders with exist-
ing stock investments, but grandfathering and other transition 
mechanisms could eliminate or reduce those gains. Congress can 
calibrate transition gains and losses with considerable precision, ef-
fectively hand-picking transition winners and losers in order to se-
cure support for pending integration legislation. Most importantly, 
the anticipated transition effects may be markedly uneven among 
managers, among shareholders, and among collateral interests, re-
sulting in various lobbying positions within these groups.  
II. EVIDENCE FROM THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S DIVIDEND-
EXCLUSION PROPOSAL 
The recent effort by President George W. Bush to integrate the 
corporate and individual income taxes illustrates how the hetero-
geneous interests of managers, shareholders, and third parties con-
tribute to the stubborn persistence of the corporate double tax. In 
2003, President Bush proposed integration under the dividend-
164 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 79, at 94 (describing a change to the effective date of 
suspension of investment tax credit made specifically to accommodate Trans World 
Airlines). 
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exclusion model. The proposal set off furious lobbying activity 
among potential winners and losers, and Congress ultimately re-
jected outright integration in favor of reducing the tax rate on divi-
dends.165 Consistent with the heterogeneity analysis outlined above, 
managers divided sharply on the proposal; so too did shareholders. 
Additionally, the proposal elicited both support and opposition 
from collateral interests that had much to win or lose under the 
specific integration terms setting out the dividend exclusion. In 
short, the evidence from the Bush administration’s dividend-
exclusion proposal reveals a complex and nuanced story of political 
interests and political positioning, with certain managers, share-
holders, and third parties giving strong support and other manag-
ers, shareholders, and third parties presenting strong opposition. 
The complex interests put into play by the proposal simply cannot 
be reduced to a single dimension (such as a divergence between 
manager interests and shareholder interests, as suggested by the 
agency-cost explanation).166  
A. The Divided-Exclusion Proposal 
The Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal was a 
reasonably straightforward integration plan.167 President Bush an-
nounced the proposal in early January 2003168 and he submitted it 
to Congress in February 2003169 with a pledge that the proposal 
would tax corporate profits “once and only once.”170 The proposal 
included two mechanisms for eliminating the shareholder-level tax 
165 As described in Section I.A, supra, the Jobs and Growth Act made dividends 
generally taxable at (lower) capital-gains rates rather than (higher) ordinary-income 
rates; the capital-gains rates apply through 2010. 
166 The author was an attorney in the Office of Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury De-
partment throughout the pendency of the dividend-exclusion proposal. The analysis 
of the political activity described in this Part (II) is based on documents in the public 
record, interviews with former government officials in the executive and legislative 
branches, and the author’s own experience with the dividend-exclusion proposal and 
the lobbying positions that it generated. 
167 The description of the proposal set forth here omits certain technical details. For 
a full description, see Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra note 10, at 11–22, and Staff of 
Joint Comm. on Taxation, 108th Cong., Description of Revenue Provisions Contained 
in the President’s Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Proposal 18–33 (Comm. Print 2003).  
168 Press Release, The White House, supra note 9. 
169 See Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra note 10, at 11–22. 
170 Id. at 12. 
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on corporate profits: a shareholder dividend exclusion for distrib-
uted profits, and a shareholder basis adjustment for retained prof-
its. Any corporate profits taxed at the corporate level and then dis-
tributed as dividends would be excludable from shareholder 
income.171 For example, a corporation that earned $100 of taxable 
income and paid $35 in tax could distribute $65 to its shareholders 
as an excludable dividend.172 Any corporate profits taxed at the 
corporate level and then retained by the corporation would in-
crease the shareholders’ basis in their stock; that, in turn, would 
decrease any taxable gain realized by the shareholders upon sale of 
the stock.173 For example, the shareholders of a corporation that 
earned $100 of taxable income, paid $35 in tax, and retained the 
$65 after-tax amount would increase their stock basis by $65. On a 
subsequent sale of their stock, the basis increase would reduce the 
shareholders’ taxable gain by $65.174 This basis adjustment effec-
tively would allow a corporation’s shareholders to obtain a tax 
benefit for the retained earnings.175 
Several features of the proposal deserve note. First, because the 
proposal did not condition integration on the actual distribution of 
corporate profits, it would have removed the bias in favor of re-
taining profits without creating a bias in favor of distributing prof-
its. Second, the proposal did condition integration on the payment 
of corporate-level tax: shareholders of a corporation that success-
fully sheltered its profits from corporate-level tax would get neither 
a dividend exclusion nor a basis adjustment for the sheltered prof-
its. Third, the proposal potentially reduced the value of corporate 
171 Id. 
172 The proposal required each corporation to track an “excludable dividend 
amount” (“EDA”) to determine the portion of its profits for a year that had been 
taxed and, as such, could be distributed to shareholders tax-free. Id. at 12–14. 
173 Id. at 12, 19. 
174 Any EDA not distributed to shareholders during a year would be credited to the 
corporation’s “retained earnings basis adjustments.” Id. at 14–15. 
175 To put it another way, the basis adjustment ensured that shareholders would not 
be taxable on the appreciation of their stock attributable to profits that had been 
taxed at the corporate level. Id. at 19. A third way to put the point is that the basis ad-
justment had the effect of a DRIP. See supra notes 144–145 and accompanying text. 
But see Yin, supra note 124, at 470–71 (arguing that DRIPs may not achieve full 
equivalence for taxation of distributed and retained earnings under the dividend-
exclusion model). 
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tax preferences because utilization of those preferences would re-
duce the shareholder-level excludable dividends and basis adjust-
ments.176 Fourth, the proposal did not change the tax treatment of 
shareholders that themselves were exempt from tax.177 Finally, the 
effective date of the proposal would have applied the new rules to 
distributions and basis adjustments made after 2002 with respect to 
corporate taxes paid for taxable years ending on or after April 1, 
2001.178 In other words, the proposal would have applied integra-
tion to amounts already invested in corporate stock at the time of 
enactment. 
B. Lobbying Positions of Managers and Collateral Interests 
Consistent with the heterogeneity analysis set forth in Part I, 
corporate managers lined up on both sides of the dividend-
exclusion proposal. Influential lobbying groups representing man-
agers pushed the Bush administration to make the proposal in the 
first place and then dedicated substantial resources to promoting it 
in Congress. But other managers opposed the proposal. Part of 
that opposition stemmed from concerns about shareholder pres-
sure to distribute earnings, and part was driven by concerns about 
protecting tax preferences. However, the strongest opposition on 
the management side came from non-manager third parties: collat-
eral interests—specifically, those selling tax-preferenced invest-
ments to corporations—raised serious concerns about the effects of 
the proposal on their industries. Those concerns clearly resonated 
with legislators.179 
176 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 167, at 30–31.  
177 See Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra note 10, at 21. Certain private foundations, 
otherwise exempt from tax, pay a small tax on their investment income. See I.R.C. 
§ 4940 (West 2008). The proposal would have extended the shareholder-level benefits 
to those foundations. Treasury 2003 Bluebook, supra note 10, at 21. 
178 Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 167, at 27. See also President’s 
Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
108th Cong. 78–79 (2003) (question-and-answer between Rep. E. Clay Shaw, Jr. and 
William Gale of the Brookings Institute). 
179 The agency-cost explanation did not predict many of these manager positions and 
it did not account for the existence and influence of collateral interests on the man-
agement side. The agency-cost explanation predicted that managers would adopt one 
of two positions in response to integration proposals. The larger group of managers 
would show “diffidence” toward integration. Although these managers are not hostile 
to integration, they regard it largely as a windfall for existing investments, and they 
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Managers generally showed strong support for the  
dividend-exclusion proposal both directly and through their  
lobbying groups.180 Perhaps no group was as influential as  
The Business Roundtable (“BRT”), an association of chief  
executive officers. The BRT claimed credit for having urged  
the Bush administration to make an integration proposal.181 Once 
President Bush released his dividend-exclusion proposal, the BRT 
expressed unqualified support for it on Capitol Hill
182
 and in press  
prefer tax subsidies for new investments. Because the dividend-exclusion proposal 
applied to existing stock investments, the agency-cost explanation predicted that 
managers would show unenthusiastic support for the proposal. The smaller group of 
managers is hostile to integration because it undermines the retained-earnings trap. 
The dividend-exclusion proposal generally equalized the tax treatment of distributed 
and retained earnings, so the agency-cost explanation predicted opposition from this 
group. Interestingly, the agency-cost explanation specifically predicted that managers 
benefitting from the retained-earnings trap could be mollified by an integration pro-
posal that does not pass corporate tax preferences through to shareholders and that 
includes a DRIP. As demonstrated below, the inclusion of a DRIP in the dividend-
exclusion proposal does appear to have deflected arguments that the proposal would 
force managers to distribute earnings. The fact, however, that the proposal did not 
provide for the pass-through of corporate tax preferences provoked strong opposition 
from both managers and influential collateral interests. 
180 A red-herring issue should be addressed up front. While the dividend-exclusion 
proposal was pending, the press reported that the White House was pressuring lobby-
ists to support the proposal. See, e.g., Laurence McQuillan, Investors Targeted in 
Tax-Cut Push, USA Today, Mar. 4, 2003, at 1A; Patti Mohr & Warren Rojas, Treas-
ury to Extend Benefit of Dividend Exclusion to Annuities, Snow Says, Tax Notes To-
day, Mar. 5, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 43-1; Jonathan Weisman & Mike Allen, Bush 
Seeks to Enlist Economists’ Support, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 2003, at A7; Jonathan 
Weisman, Bush Wins Business Support for Growth Plan, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 2003, at 
E1, E14 [hereinafter Weisman, Bush Wins Business Support]; Jonathan Weisman, 
White House Intensifies Push for Tax Plan, Wash. Post, Jan. 16, 2003, at E1, E7 [here-
inafter Weisman, White House Intensifies Push]. It would be a mistake, however, to 
infer from those reports that the support provided for the proposal by managers was 
not sincere. See Interview with Hon. Pamela F. Olson, former Assistant Treasury 
Sec’y, Tax Policy, in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 22, 2008); Interview with Robert Winters, 
former Chief Tax Counsel of the House Ways & Means Comm., in Wash., D.C. (Sept. 
22, 2008).  
181 Press Release, The Business Roundtable, The Business Roundtable Releases 
Study Showing Positive GDP and Job Growth Impact of President’s Economic Pack-
age (Jan. 30, 2003) (“Last November, the CEOs of The Business Roundtable called 
for enactment of a significant economic growth package that included eliminating the 
double taxation of dividends for individuals.”). 
182 President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 108th Cong. 62 (2003) (statement of John J. Castellani, President of The 
Business Roundtable) [hereinafter Castellani, Ways & Means]. 
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statements.183 The BRT assured Congress that the Administration’s 
legislative package would “provide[ ] exactly the kind of boost our 
economy needs” and that the “dividend component of 
the    plan    will have the single most positive impact on economic 
growth in both the short term and the long term.”184 The group em-
phasized that it was “preparing to reach into its deep pockets to 
fund a diverse lobbying, advertising and grassroots campaign”; it 
considered the dividend-exclusion proposal to be as important as 
free-trade legislation.185 
Other corporate lobbying groups did not want to be left off the 
bandwagon. The Tax Relief Coalition (“TRC”), an umbrella group 
of more than 1,000 lobbying organizations that collectively repre-
sented more than 1.8 million businesses, formed a task force “to 
launch a concerted campaign to promote the economic benefits of 
[the] dividend proposal.”186 The American Forest & Paper Associa-
tion “strongly support[ed]” the dividend-exclusion proposal to ad-
dress the high effective tax rates on corporate forestry operations 
and paper manufacturing.187 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
called the dividend-exclusion proposal “important” and argued 
that “[w]hile the direct benefits go to stockholders, indirect bene-
fits will accrue to the entire economy.”188 The National Association 
of Manufacturers (“NAM”) “strongly support[ed]” the Admini-
stration’s legislative package and argued that “[t]he dividends-
exclusion proposal is particularly important to manufacturers.”189 
183 Janet Hook, Bush Plan to End Dividend Tax in for Changes, L.A. Times, Feb. 2, 
2003, at A30. 
184 Castellani, Ways & Means, supra note 182, at 63–64. 
185 BRT Prepared to Dig Deep in Support of Bush Tax Plan, Nat’l J.’s Congress-
Daily, Apr. 25, 2003 [hereinafter BRT Prepared to Dig Deep]. 
186 Patti Mohr & Warren Rojas, Interest Groups Line Up on All Sides of Debate on 
Bush’s Tax Cut, Tax Notes Today, Mar. 4, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 42-1; see also 
Weisman, Bush Wins Business Support, supra note 180, at E1; Weisman, White 
House Intensifies Push, supra note 180, at E1. 
187 President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 108th Cong. 240 (2003) (statement of the American Forest & Paper Asso-
ciation). 
188 President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 108th Cong. 338 (2003) (statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce). 
189 President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 108th Cong. 308–09 (2003) (statement of Michael E. Baroody, National As-
sociation of Manufacturers). 
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Managers of individual companies also spoke publicly in favor of 
the proposal.190 
Interestingly, the BRT identified the expected windfall to exist-
ing investments as a reason for supporting the dividend-exclusion 
proposal.191 Several managers even asked that the anticipated wind-
fall be enlarged.192 It may be that, on this point, managers were par-
ticularly mindful of their own status as shareholders; any rise in the 
values of existing shares would both increase the value of their own 
stock holdings and increase the value of their unexercised stock op-
tions.193 In fact, it may well be that it was precisely this expected 
windfall for existing equity investments that drove the ardent sup-
190 See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Companies Mobilize to Save Bush Plan to Scrap Divi-
dend Tax, Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 2003, at E1, E5; Weisman, White House Intensifies 
Push, supra note 180, at E1; Verizon, Other Firms Rally Behind Bush’s Tax-Cut Plan, 
Nat’l J.’s Technology Daily, Feb. 20, 2003. For additional statements of managers in 
favor of the proposal, see, e.g., Letter from Robert L. Nardelli, Chairman, President, 
and Chief Executive Officer of The Home Depot, to John Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Feb. 
7, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Feb. 27, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 39-170. 
191 See Castellani, Ways & Means, supra note 182, at 62, 64 (supporting the proposal 
because of its ability to increase the value of existing equity); see also Paying Divi-
dends: How the President’s Tax Plan Will Benefit Individual Investors and 
Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & 
Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 108th Cong. 38–39 (2003) (statement of 
John J. Castellani, President of The Business Roundtable) (same). This, of course, 
contrasts with the argument of the agency-cost explanation that the potential windfall 
for existing investments makes managers diffident with respect to integration and that 
“[m]ost managers . . . . should support” an integration proposal that would “minimize 
windfalls by implementing integration in stages.” Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 365. 
192 After the dividend exclusion was proposed, the Bush administration agreed to 
modify it to treat income sheltered by certain alternative minimum tax credits as eli-
gible for tax-free distributions. Jonathan Weisman, GOP Aides Revise Bill to Help 
Big Firms, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 2003, at E1 [hereinafter Weisman, GOP Aides Revise 
Bill]. This enlarged the potential integration windfall (assuming such a windfall would 
result) for existing shares of “such blue-chip giants as International Business Ma-
chines Corp., Ford Motor Co. and General Electric Co.” Id. The change apparently 
was met with the approval of management at Ford Motor Co.; in May 2003, the com-
pany’s chief executive officer published commentary supporting the dividend-
exclusion proposal. Bill Ford, Op-Ed., Accelerate the Recovery, Wall St. J., May 13, 
2003, at A18. The Edison Electric Institute sought to enlarge the anticipated windfall 
through the treatment of income sheltered by other tax credits as eligible for tax-free 
distributions. President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 258 (2003) (statement of Edison Electric Institute). 
193 Ben White, Bush’s Tax-Cut Proposal Would Benefit Some CEOs, L.A. Times, 
Jan. 13, 2003, at C5. 
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port of managers and manager lobbying groups such as the BRT. 
But if managers were in fact determining the lobbying positions of 
their companies on the basis of how the dividend-exclusion pro-
posal would affect them in their capacity as individual sharehold-
ers, they understandably did not call attention to that as they lob-
bied for the proposal. 
Additionally, managers supporting the dividend-exclusion pro-
posal made it clear that they preferred integration to the enact-
ment of targeted tax preferences. For example, NAM mentioned 
only at the end of its written testimony—after having already ex-
pressed unqualified support to the dividend-exclusion proposal—
that it “also believe[d]” that measures such as accelerated depre-
ciation and the research-and-development credit “would benefit 
the American economy.”194 The BRT went even further: in re-
sponse to a question during his testimony before the House Ways 
and Means Committee, the president of the BRT specifically said 
that the BRT members preferred integration to accelerated depre-
ciation and similar targeted tax subsidies.195 
Managers expressed few concerns about the effect of the divi-
dend-exclusion proposal on the retained-earnings trap. There were 
weak suggestions that the proposal would benefit only sharehold-
ers of corporations paying regular dividends.196 That, of course, was 
not accurate: the basis-adjustment feature of the proposal ensured 
194 Hearing, supra note 189, at 309. The strong pitch for integration and the weak 
pitch for targeted preferences is exactly the opposite of what the agency-cost explana-
tion predicts. 
195 Castellani, Ways & Means, supra note 182, at 87; see also BRT Prepared to Dig 
Deep, supra note 185 (reporting that the BRT president “showed little enthusiasm for 
moves to add increased bonus depreciation” to dividend-exclusion proposal). As pre-
dicted by the agency-cost explanation, there were other managers who argued for tar-
geted tax preferences over the dividend-exclusion proposal, although the extent of 
that sentiment among managers is not clear. One news article suggested that “many 
companies want to scale back the dividend cut in exchange for other tax breaks, such 
as accelerated depreciation.” Howard Gleckman & Richard S. Dunham, Taxes: How 
Many Arms Can One President Twist? Bus. Wk., Mar. 10, 2003, at 45. The suggestion 
that “many companies” took this position is difficult to reconcile with the public 
statements of the BRT and NAM; it may well be that the reporters on the news story, 
consistent with industry practice, simply generalized a point made to them by only 
one or two sources. 
196 See Cha, supra note 190, at E5 (reporting that small technology companies that 
did not pay regular dividends “have kept quiet or urged legislators to consider other 
tax breaks”). 
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that integration would not be conditioned on the actual distribu-
tion of corporate profits. More to the point, some managers ob-
jected that the proposal would interfere with their discretion to re-
tain or distribute earnings.197 Nonetheless, this position was not 
widely argued.198 It may be that (just as the agency-cost explanation 
suggests) the retained-earnings trap benefits only a few managers; 
or it may be that managers find it difficult to defend the retained-
earnings trap in public. 
More prominent than the soft protests from managers of earn-
ings-trapping corporations was the strong support from managers 
of dividend-paying corporations. Even though the dividend-
exclusion proposal would not have created a bias for or against 
dividends, many managers of corporations that paid regular divi-
dends lobbied hard for the proposal precisely because it would 
have removed the double-tax bias against dividends. For example, 
the American Gas Association, representing companies with more 
than 80% of the market share for natural gas, said that its members 
regularly paid out nearly two-thirds of their net income as divi-
dends and that the proposal “would provide [them] a unique bene-
fit.”199 Similarly, the Edison Electric Institute, representing compa-
nies with 70% of the market share for electricity, said that its 
members usually paid out about 58% of their earnings as dividends 
and urged Congress to “act quickly to eliminate the double taxa-
tion of corporate dividends.”200 The chief executive officer of Ex-
elon Corporation, who said that his company normally paid out 
about 50% of its earnings as dividends, and a vice president of 
Texas Instruments Incorporated, who said that her company had 
paid quarterly dividends for decades, both testified in strong sup-
197 Howard Gleckman & Richard S. Dunham, From All Sides, Bus. Wk., Feb. 24, 
2003, at 34, 36; Jonathan Krim, Tech Companies See Bush Plan on Dividends as 
Troublesome, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 2003, at E1, E2. 
198 This is consistent with the prediction of the agency-cost explanation. 
199 President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 108th Cong. 246–250 (2003) (Statement of American Gas Association); see 
also AGA Sees Potential Boost to Gas Utilities in President Bush’s Proposal to Lift 
Taxes on Corporate Dividends, Foster Nat. Gas Rep., Jan. 9, 2003, at 14 (describing 
the benefits of the proposal to high dividend-paying gas companies). 
200 Hearing, supra note 192, at 255–56. 
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port of the proposal.201 These statements apparently reflected broad 
sentiment among dividend-paying companies.202 
Managers in particular industries did express definite concerns, 
however, about the effects of the dividend-exclusion proposal on 
corporate tax preferences.203 Those concerns resonated with legisla-
tors,204 including the powerful Chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee, who ultimately changed the dividend exclusion into a 
reduced tax rate on dividends.205 The concerns centered on the fact 
201 Promoting Corporate Responsibility Through the Reduction of Dividend Taxes: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Aff. & Product Safety of the S. Comm. 
on Com., Sci., and Transp., 108th Cong. 17–21(2003) (statement of John W. Rowe, 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Exelon Corporation); Promoting Corporate 
Responsibility Through the Reduction of Dividend Taxes: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Aff. & Product Safety of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and 
Transp., 108th Cong. 13–17 (2003) (statement of Elizabeth W. Bull, Treasurer and 
Vice President, Texas Instruments Incorporated).  
202 See Dividend Tax Repeal Proposal May Be Boon for Utility Shares, Nat. Gas 
Wk., Jan. 10, 2003 (describing the benefits of the dividends-exclusion proposal to the 
utilities industry). For examples of particular high dividend-paying companies that 
supported the dividend-exclusion proposal, see Letter from Richard R. Grigg, Execu-
tive Vice President of Wisconsin Energy Corporation, to John Snow, Treasury Sec’y 
Designate (Jan. 15, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Jan. 30, 2003, LEXIS,  2003 
TNT 20-68; Letter from David N. Parker, American Gas Association, to John Snow, 
Treasury Sec’y Designate (Dec. 18, 2002), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Jan. 23, 
2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 15-32; Letter from Martin A. White, MDU Resources 
Group, Inc., to John Snow, Treasury Sec’y Designate (Jan. 2, 2003), reprinted in Tax 
Notes Today, Jan. 23, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 15-38. 
203 See Martin A. Sullivan, Dividend Déjà Vu: Will Double Tax Relief Get Canned–
Again?, 98 Tax Notes 645, 646 (2003) (“A dividend exclusion would have varied ef-
fects on different industries, so it would be a mistake to think there is unanimity 
[about the proposal] in the business community.”); Lee Walczak, Howard Gleckman, 
& Rich Miller, The Critics: A Fight Already Lost?, Bus. Wk., Jan 20, 2003, at 32, 33 
(reporting that tech companies, real estate, and pension-fund managers favored redi-
recting tax benefits toward their particular industries). Remarkably, the agency-cost 
explanation predicted that denying pass-through to corporate tax preferences would 
make integration more attractive to managers. Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 366–67. 
The experience with the Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal demon-
strated exactly the opposite. 
204 See Jonathan Weisman, Tax Credits Lose Appeal in Bush Plan, Wash. Post, Feb. 
26, 2003, at E1, E10 [hereinafter Weisman, Tax Credits Lose Appeal]. 
205 See John D. McKinnon & Shailagh Murray, Washington Wrestles with Tax Bill: 
Tensions Increase as House Proposes Options at Odds with White House, Senate, 
Wall St. J., May 2, 2003, at A2 (reporting that Chairman Thomas supported a version 
of the proposal that would benefit “[c]ompanies with lots of tax breaks”); Patti Mohr 
& Warren Rojas, Interest Groups Test Bush Idea of ‘Single Tax’ on Dividends, 98 
Tax Notes 1471 (2003); Jonathan Weisman, In House, Fight Brews over Bush Tax 
Plan, Wash. Post, Apr. 27, 2003, at A5; Jonathan Weisman, Thomas Questions Divi-
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that the proposal conditioned the shareholder-level benefits of in-
tegration on the payment of corporate-level taxes. Managers ar-
gued that this requirement would create a bias in favor of taxable 
corporate income over tax-preferenced corporate income and 
would undermine the value of corporate tax preferences.206 The 
high-technology and pharmaceutical industries, for example, ex-
pressed concerns about the effect of the proposal on the research-
and-development credit; the energy industry objected to the effects 
on tax preferences for oil exploration and the use of wind and 
other renewable energy; and the construction industry objected to 
the effects on the low-income housing tax credit and similar pref-
erences.207 
dend Tax Cuts, Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 2003, at A4; see also President’s Economic 
Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 96–
97, 110 (2003) (remarks of Rep. Bill Thomas). At least one account argues that 
Chairman Thomas changed the proposal at the suggestion of Vice President Cheney. 
See Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency 255–57, 269–75 (2008). 
206 The agency-cost explanation suggests that managers may be leery of integration if 
they believe that the revenue loss from eliminating the double tax would be made up 
through repeal of specific corporate tax preferences. As proposed, however, the Bush 
administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal would not have been paid for by any 
offsetting tax increases. 
207 See Mohr & Rojas, supra note 205, at 1472 (describing the potential impact on 
the low-income housing tax credit program); Dividend Break Might Undercut Fed-
eral Incentives, Tax Incentives Alert, Feb. 2003, at 19 (noting objections from compa-
nies that benefit from R&D credits); Gleckman & Dunham, supra note 197, at 36 (de-
scribing objections from tech companies); Gleckman & Dunham, supra note 195, at 
45 (noting objections from companies that benefit from accelerated depreciation); 
Greg Hitt & John D. McKinnon, Business Fears Dividend Tax Cut Could Undermine 
Popular Breaks, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 2003, at B4 (describing potential objections from 
companies involved in research and development, school construction, and renewable 
energy); Krim, supra note 197, at E5; Mohr & Rojas, supra note 186 (describing the 
efforts of the National Council of State Housing Agencies in opposing the dividend-
exclusion proposal because of its potentially “severe[ ] adverse impact” on low-
income housing tax credits); Weisman, Tax Credits Lose Appeal, supra note 204, at 
E1 (describing the impact of the dividends exclusion proposal on low-income housing, 
alternative energy, and research and development credits); Weisman, White House 
Intensifies Push, supra note 180, at E1 (describing the opposition of the American 
Electronics Association); see also Paying Dividends: How the President’s Tax Plan 
Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing Be-
fore the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 
108th Cong. 28 (2003) (remarks of Rep. Joseph Crowley) (expressing concern regard-
ing the effects of the dividends-exclusion proposal on R&D tax credits). 
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All else equal, conditioning the shareholder-level exclusion and 
basis adjustment on the payment of corporate-level tax would have 
had the effect of making a corporation with low utilization of cor-
porate tax preferences a more attractive investment, in relative 
terms, than it is under the status quo. The dividend-exclusion pro-
posal would have reduced the value of corporate tax preferences 
and, correspondingly, would have raised the cost of capital for cor-
porations relying on those preferences. This concern, however, was 
not universal among managers. The unqualified support for the 
proposal from the BRT, the TRC, NAM, and other lobbying 
groups indicates that, in many cases, managers were willing to 
trade the anticipated benefits of integration off against the antici-
pated costs of weakened tax preferences. But that baseline of 
managerial support only underscores the importance that other 
managers attached to their tax preferences. They defied both their 
corporate counterparts and the Bush administration to press their 
opposition. The status quo put them at the higher end of an uneven 
playing field, and they fought to defend the advantage. 
Importantly, the potential of the dividend-exclusion proposal 
to reduce the value of corporate tax preferences drew  
collateral interests on the management side directly into the  
fray.208 Lobbying groups from the low-income housing industry 
were the most visible, forceful, and relentless.209 These groups  
did not represent managers; they represented interests  
dependent on the ability to sell low-income housing tax credits to 
corporations. They flooded Capitol Hill,210 the Treasury 
208 As indicated above, the agency-cost explanation does not account at all for the 
role of collateral interests. 
209 See Sandra Fleishman, Dividend Plan Called Threat to Affordable Housing, 
Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 2003, at A4; Weisman, GOP Aides Revise Bill, supra note 192, at 
E3; Weisman, Tax Credits Lose Appeal, supra note 204, at E1. 
210 For legislative testimony, see Paying Dividends: How the President’s Tax Plan 
Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing Be-
fore the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 
108th Cong. 101–11 (2003) (statement of James R. Rayburn, First Vice President, Na-
tional Association of Home Builders); Paying Dividends: How the President’s Tax 
Plan Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Ser-
vices, 108th Cong. 42–44 (2003) (statement of William E. Spriggs, Executive Director, 
National Urban League Institute for Opportunity and Equality); President’s Eco-
nomic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th 
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Department,211 and the press212 with their argument that the divi-
dend-exclusion proposal would cause a serious contraction in the 
supply of affordable housing. The case was straightforward. Corpo-
rations effectively constitute the market for the purchase of low-
income housing tax credits; those corporate investments in turn fi-
nance the construction of affordable housing.213 The dividend-
exclusion proposal, however, would have caused corporate manag-
Cong. 236–39 (2003) (statement of the Affordable Housing Tax Credit Coalition); 
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means, 108th Cong. 185–96 (2003) (statement of Richard H. Godfrey, Jr., Executive 
Director, Rhode Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corporation, and Vice Presi-
dent, National Council of State Housing Agencies); President’s Economic Growth 
Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 258–61 
(2003) (statement of F. Barton Harvey, III, Enterprise Foundation); President’s Eco-
nomic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th 
Cong. 301–07 (2004) (statement of National Association of Home Builders); Presi-
dent’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means, 108th Cong. 313–19 (2003) (statement of New Markets Tax Credit Coalition); 
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means, 108th Cong. 309–12 (2003) (statement of Raul Yzaguirre, National Council of 
La Raza).  
211 For correspondence with the Treasury Department, see President’s Economic 
Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 
104–05 (2003) (letter from Barbara J. Thompson, Executive Director, National Coun-
cil of State Housing Agencies, to John W. Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Feb. 25, 2003)); Let-
ter from Susan G. Baker, Co-Chairman, National Alliance to End Homelessness and 
Trustee, The Enterprise Foundation, to John W. Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Feb. 19, 
2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Feb. 27, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 39-169; Letter 
from Conrad Egan, Executive Director, National Housing Conference, to John W. 
Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Mar. 3, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Mar. 14, 2003, 
LEXIS, 2003 TNT 50-35; Letter from Judith A. Kennedy, President, National Asso-
ciation of Affordable Housing Lenders, to Pamela F. Olson, Asst. Treasury Sec’y 
(Jan. 20, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Feb. 6, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 25-80; 
Letter from Frank Schubert, Chairman, Cowlitz-Wahkiakum Housing Advisory 
Committee, to Pamela F. Olson, Asst. Treasury Sec’y (Jan. 22, 2003), reprinted in Tax 
Notes Today, Feb. 13, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 30-40. 
212 For statements in the press, see Jan Breidenbach & Gordon Conway, A Cloud 
Over Low-Cost Housing, L.A. Times, Mar. 6, 2003, at B17 (commentary by low-
income housing advocates); Richard Moe, White House Plan on Dividends Needs 
Renovation, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 2003, at D8 (commentary by the president of the Na-
tional Trust for Historic Preservation). 
213 In the question-and-answer part of his testimony before the Ways and Means 
Committee, one lobbyist flatly asserted that “[a]ffordable housing is a noneconomic 
activity” and that “[i]f we are going to bring the private sector in, then the Tax Code 
is the way to do it.” Hearings, supra note 210, at 194 (statement of Richard H. God-
frey, Jr.).  
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ers to prefer taxable profits over tax-preferenced profits so that 
they could pass along excludable dividends and basis adjustments 
to their shareholders. In effect, the proposal might have caused 
managers to scale back corporate investments in low-income hous-
ing tax credits, raising construction costs in that industry. Although 
it was generally assumed that these consequences had not been in-
tended by the Bush administration, the lobbying groups represent-
ing the industry predicted very adverse consequences for afford-
able housing—and few in Congress wanted to identify themselves 
with that outcome.214 State and local governments issuing tax-
exempt bonds and investment firms trading and dealing those 
bonds objected to the proposal for similar reasons.215 They argued 
214 See Paying Dividends: How the President’s Tax Plan Will Benefit Individual In-
vestors and Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 108th Cong. 21–22 (2003) 
(remarks of Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (R-Tex.)); President’s Economic Growth Propos-
als: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 221–24 (2003) 
(statement of Rep. Robert W. Ney (R-Ohio)); President’s Economic Growth Propos-
als: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. (2003) at 13, 210 
(remarks of Rep. Nancy Johnson (R-Conn.)); id. at 41 (remarks of Rep. Kenny Hul-
shof (R-Mo.)); id. at 44, 127 (remarks of Rep. Stephanie Tubbs Jones (R-Ohio)); id. 
at 100 (remarks of Rep. Richard Neal (R-Mass.)); id. at 233 (remarks of Rep. Paul 
Ryan (R-Wis.)); see also Mohr & Rojas, supra note 180 (“Several taxwriters from 
both sides of the aisle complained that the proposal would reduce the value of the 
low-income housing tax credit program.”). 
215 See President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 155–72 (2003) (statement of Alan G. Hevesi, New York 
State Comptroller); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 312–13 (2003) (statement of National Educa-
tion Association); Letter from John R. Vogt, Executive Vice President, Bond Market 
Ass’n, to Pamela F. Olson, Asst. Treasury Sec’y (Jan. 27, 2003), reprinted in Tax 
Notes Today, Feb. 6, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 25-91; see also Greg Hitt, Bush Faces 
New Tax-Relief Foe: Municipal-Bond Adherents Mount a Lobbying Effort, Wall St. 
J., Apr. 15, 2003, at A4; Christina Ling, Bush Retirement Proposals Worry Municipal 
Issuers, Reuters News, Feb. 11, 2003; Tom Petruno, California Pays Costly Yields on 
Tobacco Bonds, L.A. Times, Jan. 16, 2003, at C1 (reporting concerns expressed by 
municipal bond fund managers in California); Weisman, Tax Credits Lose Appeal, 
supra note 204, at E1, E5 (discussing the concerns of the Bond Market Association); 
William M. Welch, Bush Faces Bipartisan Opposition to Repeal of Dividends Tax, 
USA Today, Mar. 4, 2003, at 6A. Similar concerns were expressed, although less in-
tensely, about the effects of the dividend-exclusion proposal on credit unions and 
banks. See Letter from America’s Community Bankers, American Bankers Associa-
tion, and Independent Community Bankers of America, to William M. Thomas, 
Chairman, H. Comm. on Ways & Means (Mar. 31, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes To-
day, Apr. 3, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 64-29; Ed Roberts, Bush Stimulus Package 
Could Effect CU Shares, Credit Union J., Jan. 13, 2003, at 8.  
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that the expected shift by managers from tax-preferenced income 
to taxable income would cause corporations to purchase fewer tax-
exempt bonds. The concern was particularly acute as to property 
and casualty insurance companies, which ordinarily invest heavily 
in tax-exempt bonds.216 Reduced corporate investment in tax-
exempt bonds, of course, would drive up the interest rates on those 
bonds, thereby increasing the costs of borrowing for state and local 
governments. 
The lobbying positions on the management side, then, reflected 
the heterogeneity of interests attributable to the unevenness of the 
corporate-level tax. Many managers strongly supported the divi-
dend-exclusion proposal; they even stated publicly that they 
wanted integration more than they wanted targeted tax prefer-
ences. Other managers objected to the proposal because of their 
concerns about pressure to distribute earnings or in defense of 
their corporate tax preferences. The strongest opposition on the 
management side, however, came not from managers, but from 
collateral interests that claimed they would be seriously harmed by 
the proposal. These interests elicited sympathy and support from 
legislators and influenced the legislative outcome. 
C. Lobbying Positions of Shareholders and Collateral Interests 
A similar pattern of heterogeneous positions emerged in the 
lobbying activities on the shareholder side.217 Support for the divi-
216 President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 108th Cong. 250–52 (2003) (statement of American Insurance Association); 
President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means, 108th Cong. 152–55 (2003) (statement of Ronald Stack, Managing Director 
and Head of Finance, Lehman Brothers, and Chairman, Municipal Securities Divi-
sion, Bond Market Association). 
217 The lobbying positions of shareholders occupy an almost inconsequential role in 
the agency-cost explanation. The explanation identifies the anticipated windfall to ex-
isting investments as a significant (although not inevitable) characteristic of integra-
tion, and it predicts that individual shareholders therefore will favor eliminating the 
double tax. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 338, 347. The account argues, how-
ever, that individual shareholders face substantial collective-action problems that pre-
vent them from lobbying effectively. By contrast, institutional shareholders do not 
face the same collective-action problems, but many (such as retirement plans) may be 
stifled by federal prohibitions on lobbying. See id. at 363–65. As applied to the Bush 
administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal, the predictions of the agency-cost ex-
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dend-exclusion proposal was almost non-existent among individual 
shareholders.218 One retiree testified for the proposal at an incon-
sequential hearing,219 and a few individuals220 wrote letters support-
ing the exclusion of dividends. The scarcity of individual support 
was highlighted by the fact that several large corporations—
including Verizon,221 AT&T,222 and General Motors223—sent letters 
to tens of thousands of their shareholders extolling the benefits of 
the dividend-exclusion proposal. Financial institutions and their 
lobbying groups—such as Morgan Stanley224 and the Securities In-
dustry Association225—made similar appeals to investors in addition 
to supporting the proposal through direct lobbying efforts.226 But 
planation regarding shareholders were in part correct, particularly as to individual 
shareholders. However, the agency-cost explanation did not accurately predict either 
the interests or lobbying ability of certain institutional shareholders, nor did it account 
at all for collateral interests on the shareholder side. 
218 This is consistent with the predictions of the agency-cost explanation. 
219 Tax Fairness: Does Double Taxation Unfairly Target Older Americans?: Hearing 
Before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 55–59 (2003) (statement by Dick 
Buxton). The hearing was inconsequential because the committee lacked any jurisdic-
tion over legislation concerning the dividend-exclusion proposal. 
220 See, e.g., Letter from Dewey W. Corley to John Breaux, S. from La. (Apr. 16, 
2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, May 1, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 84-14; Letter 
from Dewey W. Corley to John W. Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Apr. 17, 2003), reprinted in 
Tax Notes Today, May 1, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 84-14; Letter from Aaron Selber, 
Jr. to John Breaux, S. from La. (Apr. 16, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, May 1, 
2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 84-14; Letter from Jess J. Waguespack to Jim McCrery, Rep. 
from La. (Jan. 13, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, Oct. 30, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 
TNT 210-37; Letter from Nedland P. Williams to Pamela F. Olson, Asst. Treasury 
Sec’y (Apr. 30, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, May 15, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 
94-35. 
221 See Weisman, Bush Wins Business Support, supra note 180, at E1. 
222 Letter from James W. Cicconi, Gen. Counsel and Exec. Vice President, AT&T, 
to John W. Snow, Treasury Sec’y (May 5, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, May 
22, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 99-29; see also George A. Plesko, We Don’t Really Know 
What It Means, But We Support It Anyway, 99 Tax Notes 1275 (2003) (summarizing 
an e-mail exchange with AT&T regarding the impact of the Bush proposal on AT&T 
shareholders). 
223 McQuillan, supra note 180. 
224 Gleckman & Dunham, supra note 195. 
225 Mike McNamee, A Love-Hate Relationship with Bush’s Tax Plan, Bus. Wk., 
Mar. 3, 2003, at 53. 
226 See, e.g., Examination of Proposals for Economic Growth and Job Creation: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 47–51 (2003) (statement of Phil 
Gramm, Vice Chairman and Managing Director, UBS Warburg); Paying Dividends: 
How the President’s Tax Plan Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the 
Capital Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of 
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even the enthusiasm of managers, brokerages, and investment 
firms apparently could not shake individual shareholders out of 
their indifference.227 
Some institutional shareholders, however, played a reasonably 
prominent role in opposing the proposal. For example, certain tax-
qualified retirement plans—along with closely aligned collateral in-
terests—objected to the dividend-exclusion proposal, and organiza-
tions representing those interests lobbied against it.228 The concern 
was that the proposal would equalize the tax treatment of holding 
stock directly and holding stock through a tax-qualified retirement 
plan. Under the status quo of the corporate double tax, holding 
stock through a tax-qualified plan results in a better tax outcome 
because dividends are effectively exempt from tax as long as the 
stock remains in the plan. Although the dividend-exclusion pro-
posal would not have changed the tax treatment of tax-qualified re-
tirement plans, it would have extended that tax result to stock held 
outside a tax-qualified plan. The plans would be worse off under 
the proposal, as a relative matter, than they were under the corpo-
rate double tax.229 
the Comm. on Fin. Services, 108th Cong. 18–35 (2003) (statement of Phil Gramm, 
Vice Chairman and Managing Director, UBS Warburg); Paying Dividends: How the 
President’s Tax Plan Will Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the Capital 
Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the 
Comm. on Fin. Services, 108th Cong. 35–37 (2003) (statement of Rick Lazio, Presi-
dent and Chief Exec. Officer, Financial Services Forum); President’s Economic 
Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 
269–73 (2003) (statement of the Investment Company Institute); President’s Eco-
nomic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th 
Cong. 133–36 (2003) (statement of John H. Schaefer, President and Chief Operating 
Officer, Individual Investor Group of Morgan Stanley & Company and Chairman, 
Board of the Securities Industry Association); see also Sullivan, supra note 203, at 646 
(“[B]rokerage firm head Charles Schwab . . . is widely credited with getting the Presi-
dent interested in this proposal . . . .”). 
227 An important qualification about individual shareholders: as argued above, at 
least some of the support for the dividend-exclusion proposal among managers may 
be attributable to the interests of managers as shareholders. 
228 Hitt, supra note 215; Walczak et al., supra note 203, at 33. 
229 At a legislative hearing on the dividend-exclusion proposal, Assistant Treasury 
Secretary Pamela Olson specifically referred to the effect on tax-exempt shareholders 
as a reason for preferring the dividend-exclusion model over the dividend-deduction 
model. In the exclusion model, corporate non-preferenced income payable to tax-
exempt shareholders is taxed at the corporate level; in the deduction model, corpo-
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This was a genuine issue for tax-qualified retirement plans. At 
the time of the proposal, those plans covered over forty percent of 
U.S. workers230 and received a substantial share of corporate divi-
dends.231 The proposal threatened to remove a primary advantage 
of the plans as investment vehicles for employees, and that threat 
was not lost on the employers sponsoring the plans or on the pro-
fessionals selling investment, actuarial, and other consulting ser-
vices to the plans.232 Although the plans themselves may have been 
unable to lobby directly, groups representing employers and con-
sultants mobilized to register their objections with legislators. The 
Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America, which represents em-
ployers sponsoring defined contribution plans, and the American 
Society of Pension Actuaries, which represents plan consultants, 
both argued to Congress that the dividend-exclusion proposal 
would discourage employers from establishing and maintaining 
tax-qualified retirement plans and that this, in turn, would under-
mine retirement income security.233 Similarly, the Employee Bene-
fit Research Institute, a think-tank for employee-benefit issues, 
agreed in legislative testimony that the proposal would weaken in-
rate non-preferenced income payable to tax-exempt shareholders is not taxed either 
at the corporate level or the shareholder level. President’s Economic Growth Propos-
als: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 9 (2003) (statement 
of Pamela Olson, Asst. Treasury Sec’y). Although tax-exempt investors such as tax-
qualified retirement plans would benefit from any windfall to existing investments, 
that provided little comfort: tax-exempt investors’ real concern was not the effect on 
existing investments but the ability to attract future investments. 
230 Satyendra K. Verma, Retirement Plan Coverage of Boomers: Analysis of 2003 
SIPP Data 7 (2006). 
231 Gale, supra note 116, at 839. 
232 Dividend Proposal Could Hurt 401(k) Plans, Experts Say, IOMA’s Report on 
Managing 401(k) Plans, Feb. 2003, at 6 [hereinafter Dividend Proposal Could Hurt 
401(k) Plans]; 401(k)s Less Attractive Under Bush Dividend Proposal, Fin. Execu-
tives News, Mar. 2003, at 17; Walczak et al., supra note 203, at 33. 
233 President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 108th Cong. 252–55 (2003) (statement of the American Society of Pension 
Actuaries); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 319–20 (2003) (statement of the Profit Sharing/401(k) 
Council of America). See also Patti Mohr, Taxwriters Examine Effect of Dividend 
Exclusion on Housing, Retirement Savings, Tax Notes Today, Mar. 7, 2003, LEXIS, 
2003 TNT 45-3. 
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centives for plan sponsorship.234 Although the lobbying groups for 
large corporate sponsors of tax-qualified plans—such as the 
American Benefits Council and the ERISA Industry Committee—
remained neutral,235 the objections raised by the groups that did 
lobby drew the firm support of legislators.236 
The life insurance industry objected to the dividend-exclusion 
proposal for similar reasons. Insurance companies sell deferred an-
nuities to individuals as tax-favored investments; the amount paid 
by the individual typically is invested by the insurance company in 
a mutual fund, but the earnings from the mutual fund are not taxed 
to the individual until she receives distributions under the annuity. 
Thus, from the perspective of the individual, investing in a mutual 
fund that holds dividend-paying stock through a deferred annuity 
generally provides a better tax outcome than investing in such a 
mutual fund directly. The dividend-exclusion proposal would have 
reversed that outcome, making the deferred annuity disadvantaged 
as a tax matter. Although the life insurance industry dutifully 
claimed to support the Bush administration’s legislative package, it 
nevertheless threatened to oppose the dividend-exclusion proposal 
unless the Treasury Department agreed to provide a basis adjust-
ment for annuity contracts that held investments in mutual funds 
234 President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 108th Cong. 174–79 (2003) (statement of Dallas L. Salisbury, President and 
Chief Executive Officer, Employee Benefit Research Institute). 
235 Dividend Proposal Could Hurt 401(k) Plans, supra note 232, at 7. The neutrality 
of these lobbying groups presumably can be attributed to the fact that the managers 
of the corporations making up those groups were actively lobbying for the proposal 
through the BRT and the TRC. 
236 See Paying Dividends: How the President’s Tax Plan Will Benefit Individual In-
vestors and Strengthen the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (re-
marks of Rep. Brad Sherman); President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Be-
fore the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. 9, 26–27, 46–47, 95–96, 105–06 
(2003) (remarks of Reps. Nancy L. Johnson, Max Sandlin, Sander M. Levin, and Bill 
Thomas); Patrice Hill, Accelerated Tax Cuts Receive Bipartisan Support, Wash. 
Times, Jan. 29, 2003, at A1; Mohr & Rojas, supra note 205, at 1473 (“[Rep.] Car-
din . . . expressed concern that the dividend exclusion would have the unintended con-
sequence of reducing incentives for small business employers to sponsored savings 
plans for their employees.”). Cf. Glenn E. Coven, Corporate Tax Policy for the 
Twenty-First Century: Integration and Redeeming Social Value, 50 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 495, 511 n.42 (1993) (implying that such objections from tax-exempt organiza-
tions would not have political traction).  
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receiving dividends.237 The president of the American Council of 
Life Insurers testified before Congress that the annuity business 
otherwise could be “devastated” by the dividend-exclusion pro-
posal.238 Impressed no doubt by the lobbying muscle of the indus-
try, legislators pressed the Secretary of the Treasury to concede 
special treatment for annuities.239 
In short, lobbying on the shareholder side of the dividend-
exclusion proposal was anything but uniform. Although individual 
shareholders were nearly silent, certain institutional shareholders 
managed to register objections to the proposal. Moreover, collat-
eral interests on the shareholder side were very active: financial in-
stitutions, such as brokerages and investment firms, supported the 
proposal and tried to enlist their customers to do the same. Inter-
ests related to tax-qualified retirement plans and the insurance in-
237 See, e.g., Letter from Frank Keating, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Ameri-
can Council of Life Insurers, to John W. Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Apr. 14, 2003), re-
printed in Tax Notes Today, April 24, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 79-15 [hereinafter 
Keating Letter to Snow]; Letter from Frank Keating, President and Chief Exec. Offi-
cer, American Council of Life Insurers, et al., to George W. Bush, President (Mar. 17, 
2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, March 18, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 52-20 [here-
inafter Keating Letter to Bush]. 
238 President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 108th Cong. 129–32 (2003) (statement of Frank Keating, President and 
Chief Executive Officer, American Council of Life Insurers). The insurance industry 
reportedly took their objections directly to cabinet members and other presidential 
advisors, issuing thinly veiled threats to unleash the lobbying power of individual in-
surance agents if the dividend-exclusion proposal was not modified to accommodate 
the industry. McNamee, supra note 225. On the concerns of insurance companies re-
garding annuities, see Mohr & Rojas, supra note 186 (describing the concerns of the 
American Council of Life Insurers); Letter from Steve Bartlett, President, Financial 
Services Roundtable, to Members of the Ways and Means Committee (Mar. 5, 2003), 
reprinted in Tax Notes Today, March 6, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 44-46; Letter from 
Maurice R. Greenberg, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, American Int’l Group, 
Inc., to John Snow, Treasury Sec’y (Feb. 26, 2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, 
March 7, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 45-56; Letter from Rick A. Lazio, President and 
Chief Exec. Officer, Financial Services Forum, to John Snow, Treasury Sec’y (May 21, 
2003), reprinted in Tax Notes Today, May 29, 2003, LEXIS, 2003 TNT 103-88. 
239 President’s Economic Growth Proposals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways 
& Means, 108th Cong. 19 (2003) (remarks of Rep. Jim McCrery); Mohr & Rojas, su-
pra note 180 (reporting that Treasury Secretary Snow announced a revision of the 
proposal to accommodate the concerns of the annuities industry). The insurance in-
dustry had another objection to the dividend-exclusion proposal: because of special 
rules applicable to insurance companies, they would have been entitled to only a pro-
rated exclusion for dividends that they received as shareholders. See Keating Letter 
to Snow, supra note 237; Out in the Cold?, Life Insurance Int’l, Feb. 28, 2003, at 11. 
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dustry, however, fought to defend their status as tax-advantaged 
investments, a status that required either special treatment under 
the proposal or the continued existence of the corporate double 
tax. 
III. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR INTEGRATION 
The analysis set out above demonstrates how the persistence of 
the corporate double tax, at least within the recent past, can be at-
tributed to the equipoise of interests favoring and opposing specific 
integration proposals.240 The failure of the Bush administration’s 
dividend-exclusion proposal underscores the magnitude of the leg-
islative obstacles to integration. Even in the case of a proposal 
made by a president whose party held majorities in both houses of 
Congress, the support of certain managers, shareholders, and col-
lateral interests could not overcome the opposition of other man-
agers, shareholders, and collateral interests who preferred retain-
ing the double tax. 
The analysis also demonstrates the inevitability of those legisla-
tive obstacles and the doubtful prospects for integration. The cor-
porate double tax imposes uneven burdens on managers and 
shareholders, and it creates uneven opportunities for collateral in-
terests. Any integration proposal necessarily creates winners and 
losers among each of these groups. Legislative proponents of inte-
gration must either roll the losers or, to the extent possible, buy 
them off with legislative concessions; it simply is not possible to 
structure legislation that would eliminate the double tax without 
provoking rational opposition from affected parties. In short, po-
litically successful integration will be as messy and as imperfect as 
240 Other scholars interpret the legislative failure of the dividend-exclusion proposal 
differently. Dan Shaviro argues that manager “support for the Bush administration’s 
corporate integration proposal was less than defeaning.” Shaviro, supra note 18, at 20. 
Karen Burke and Grayson McCouch argue that the dividend-exclusion proposal 
“failed to attract support from any major political constituency.” Karen C. Burke & 
Grayson M.P. McCouch, Turning Slogans into Tax Policy, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 747, 773 
(2008). Shaviro, however, points to no evidence supporting his assertion.  Although 
Burke and McCouch cite a handful of sources for their position, they take into ac-
count very little of the legislative record set out in Part II. 
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any successful tax legislation that changes the status quo for en-
trenched interests. 
A. Implications of the Heterogeneity Analysis 
In contrast to the agency-cost explanation, which crisply identi-
fies “managerial diffidence” as the “key” to explaining the failure 
of integration,241 the heterogeneity analysis does not imply that the 
persistence of the double tax should be attributed to a particular 
motivation or lobbying strategy of a particular interest group. 
Rather, there are many and varied interests implicated by integra-
tion of the individual income tax and the corporate income tax, and 
different integration proposals will affect those interests differ-
ently. One cannot say with confidence that managers generally will 
oppose or support integration, or even that a particular group of 
managers who oppose or support a particular integration proposal 
would adopt the same position on a different integration proposal. 
There is far too much heterogeneity to justify such categorical con-
clusions. 
In the case of the Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion pro-
posal, the basic story was that the strong support of many corpo-
rate managers ran directly into the opposition of other corporate 
managers and, importantly, of influential and sympathetic collat-
eral interests. Indeed, it appears that the collateral interests op-
posed to the dividend-exclusion proposal—such as groups depend-
ent on the low-income housing tax credit, tax-qualified retirement 
plans, and the insurance industry—were even more influential than 
the corporate managers who raised concerns about the proposal. 
The objections of these collateral interests, the “ripple effects,” as 
the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee called them,242 
struck sympathetic chords with legislators. No one in Congress 
wanted to undermine the construction of affordable housing or the 
protection of retirement income security. By framing the dividend-
exclusion proposal as inimical to those policy objectives, the collat-
eral interests positioned themselves as formidable barriers to inte-
gration. By failing to accommodate the objections of those inter-
ests, the Bush administration effectively presented legislators with 
241 Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 327. 
242 Mohr & Rojas, supra note 205, at 1473. 
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an integration proposal that they could not support. This experi-
ence suggests rather clearly that supporters of integration ignore 
the effects on collateral interests at their peril. 
A different integration proposal made under different circum-
stances surely could produce different results. Perhaps such a pro-
posal would accommodate the concerns of the low-income housing 
industry and the retirement-plan industry very well, but perhaps it 
would not be as attractive to corporate managers. Perhaps it would 
draw the active opposition of groups that supported the Bush ad-
ministration’s proposal and the support of groups that opposed it. 
The point is that any integration proposal is certain to benefit 
someone and certain to harm someone else. The simple fact that 
potential losers have been able to beat back potential winners in 
the past does not imply that integration cannot succeed, but it does 
imply that different approaches may have different prospects for 
success. 
B. A General Approach to Integration 
Predicting what approach to integration might be more or less 
successful is inherently problematic. The decisions of managers, 
shareholders, and collateral interests to support or oppose a spe-
cific legislative proposal to eliminate the double tax likely will turn 
on very fine considerations, such as whether a particular tax pref-
erence does or does not pass through to shareholders or whether 
particular equity investments are or are not grandfathered. Such 
details are not always determined ex ante; they can be modified 
during the legislative process specifically for the purpose of attract-
ing support and heading off opposition. The positions of managers, 
shareholders, and collateral interests on any specific integration 
proposal, then, potentially remain fluid as the legislative process 
unfolds. Nonetheless, the heterogeneity analysis and the experi-
ence with the Bush administration’s proposal suggest that certain 
integration models might be more promising than others as a start-
ing point for future legislative efforts. 
Any successful integration proposal must accept the inevitability 
of winners and losers. The marked unevenness of the corporate 
double tax ensures that integration will change both the absolute 
and relative positions of managers, shareholders, and collateral in-
DORAN_BOOK 4/15/2009 11:44 AM 
588 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 95:517 
 
terests; policymakers interested in advancing integration therefore 
should craft proposals that build on core constituencies of potential 
winners but allow sufficient flexibility to accommodate potential 
losers, at least on a selective basis. This implies that integration 
models pre-committing legislators on critical policy points gener-
ally will have worse prospects for success than models allowing leg-
islators to maintain flexibility during the legislative process. Com-
promise is unavoidable, and any specific legislative proposal should 
allow for that. 
Policymakers also must bear in mind that the end point of a suc-
cessful integration proposal likely will bear little resemblance to 
the starting point. Even if one begins with a theoretically pure, in-
ternally consistent integration model, the relentless and often vig-
orous pushing and pulling of the legislative process almost surely 
will yield an impure, inconsistent product. Actual integration may 
have to draw ad hoc distinctions among otherwise similar transac-
tions, corporations, shareholders, and industries—distinctions justi-
fiable with nothing better than an appeal to political necessity. 
There is no good reason to suppose that the legislative process that 
has produced the uneven and internally inconsistent corporate 
double tax would transcend itself to produce a theoretically pure 
and internally consistent integration of the corporate and individ-
ual income taxes. 
A general strategy of trying to contain integration losers suggests 
rather strongly that policymakers should not pursue integration 
under the comprehensive business income tax model. That model 
does considerably more than simply integrate corporate-level and 
shareholder-level taxes: it fundamentally changes the tax treatment 
of non-corporate business by imposing an entity-level tax on all but 
the smallest business enterprises.243 In devising the comprehensive 
business income tax, the Treasury Department acknowledged the 
broad and deep adjustments that the tax would require, and the 
government suggested that, for this reason, the tax should be 
phased in over a very long period.244 That cautiousness underscores 
the basic political point that the comprehensive business income 
tax—or any other legislative proposal that links elimination of the 
243 Treasury Integration Report, supra note 40, at 39–41.  
244 Id. at 90–91. 
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corporate double tax to reform of non-corporate taxes—
unavoidably draws additional interests into the legislative fray. 
This is not to imply that the comprehensive business income tax 
is not a sensible approach to general business tax reform or that its 
political implications are so complex that Congress could not con-
ceivably enact it. But if the legislative objective were simply to in-
tegrate the corporate and individual income taxes, the political 
complications introduced by the comprehensive business income 
tax would seem unnecessary and counter-productive. As though 
contending with managers, shareholders, and collateral interests 
were not enough, proposing the comprehensive business income 
tax would provoke both support and opposition from owners and 
managers of partnerships, limited liability companies, sole proprie-
torships, and all the third parties that have interests in the current 
taxation of non-corporate businesses. Unless one made the policy 
judgment that integration would be pointless without such general 
business tax reform, it is difficult to justify a political decision to 
pursue integration through that model.245 
A second significant inflection point is the treatment of corpo-
rate tax preferences. As demonstrated by the experience with the 
Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal, this issue drives 
a wedge among managers. Corporations with lower effective tax 
rates, which include those making greater use of tax preferences, 
have lower costs of capital than corporations with higher effective 
tax rates, which include those making less use of tax preferences. 
The pass-through of corporate tax preferences to shareholders 
245 Of course, even a straightforward integration proposal might provoke support or 
opposition from non-corporate businesses if, for example, they believe that removing 
the bias against the corporate form would adversely affect their ability to raise capital. 
Consider, for example, the effects of integration on the privately held corporations 
eligible for pass-through taxation (that is, S corporations). See generally Martin D. 
Ginsburg, Maintaining Subchapter S in an Integrated Tax World, 47 Tax L. Rev. 665 
(1992); John K. McNulty, Commentary, Preserving the Virtues of Subchapter S in an 
Integrated World, 47 Tax L. Rev. 681 (1992); Deborah H. Schenk, Commentary, 
Complete Integration in a Partial Integration World, 47 Tax L. Rev. 697 (1992). The 
experience with the Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal suggests, how-
ever, that many non-corporate businesses (and corporate businesses taxed as though 
they were non-corporate businesses) prefer to sit out the fight over integration. It is 
difficult to imagine a similar outcome if the tax treatment of non-corporate businesses 
were openly put in play. 
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helps preserve the relative advantage of low-tax corporations over 
high-tax corporations, making integration more attractive to man-
agers of low-tax corporations. Similarly, collateral interests that 
capture returns from corporate tax preferences (such as builders of 
low-income housing) generally oppose integration not providing 
for pass-through. 
That suggests that the dividend-deduction and mark-to-market 
models—neither of which readily accommodates pass-through—
are not likely to be successful. A legislative proposal under either 
model would indicate to managers of low-tax corporations and 
sympathetic collateral interests that the intended endgame for in-
tegration is a leveling of effective tax burdens and a dilution of the 
economic value of preferences. A legislator who proposed the 
dividend-deduction model or the mark-to-market model likely 
would be seen as pre-committed on this point. But there is no way 
to please everyone. Managers of high-tax corporations should pre-
fer the leveling effect of integration without pass-through, and 
competitors of the collateral interests that profit from corporate 
tax preferences also should want integration without pass-through. 
Both groups, therefore, should oppose the shareholder-allocation 
model because it effectively results in the pass-through of corpo-
rate tax preferences. 
In the end, integration either will pass corporate tax preferences 
through, raising the objections of high-tax corporations and sympa-
thetic collateral interests, or it will not pass preferences through, 
raising the objections of low-tax corporations and sympathetic col-
lateral interests. The former approach is probably the more likely 
to succeed, if only because low-tax corporations presumably have 
more political power (as evidenced by their past success in securing 
preferences). But the more promising starting point for policymak-
ers likely would be to leave the point open and accommodate ob-
jections as they arise. Both the dividend-exclusion model and the 
imputation-credit model allow integration with or without the pass-
through of corporate tax preferences; both therefore allow policy-
makers the flexibility to make adjustments during the legislative 
process. The experience with the Bush administration’s dividend-
exclusion proposal is instructive: although the dividend-exclusion 
model can allow the pass-through of tax preferences, the Bush ad-
ministration steadfastly refused to accommodate requests for pass-
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through, even in the politically sympathetic case of the low-income 
housing tax credit. Had the Bush administration made adjust-
ments—even ad hoc adjustments to allow pass-through of certain 
preferences but not others—the outcome of the proposal might 
have been different. Of course, it is also possible that selective 
pass-through cannot be contained as a political matter. Once an 
exception has been made for a particular preference, policymakers 
may find they cannot deny similar treatment for other preferences. 
Legislators should also preserve flexibility about whether to 
condition relief from double taxation on distributions of corporate 
profits. Although integration generally would remove the bias in 
favor of retaining earnings, it may or may not introduce a bias in 
favor of distributing earnings. Managers of dividend-paying corpo-
rations likely would prefer integration that requires distributions, 
but managers of other corporations likely would object strongly if 
tax policy swung sharply from an earnings-retention bias to an 
earnings-distribution bias. Neither the shareholder-allocation 
model nor the mark-to-market model conditions integration on the 
actual distribution of corporate profits. However, as noted above, 
both models effectively pre-commit to the pass-through of tax 
preferences. The dividend-deduction model, the dividend-
exclusion model, and the imputation-credit model do, in the first 
instance, condition integration on distributions; but all three mod-
els readily accommodate a dividend-reinvestment plan that—as the 
Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal showed—
extends the benefit of integration to shareholders without requir-
ing actual distributions of earnings. As with the shareholder-
allocation model, the dividend-deduction model remains problem-
atic on the treatment of corporate tax preferences; that leaves the 
dividend-exclusion and credit-imputation models with greater 
promise for success. 
The next inflection point for policymakers is to determine 
whether integration should eliminate the corporate-level tax or the 
shareholder-level tax. There are potential political considerations 
on both sides. Elimination of the shareholder-level tax generally 
removes the relative advantage that tax-exempt shareholders have 
over taxable shareholders (and, more generally, the relative advan-
tage that lower-tax shareholders have over higher-tax sharehold-
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ers). The experience under the Bush administration’s dividend-
exclusion proposal demonstrated that this is no small considera-
tion: tax-exempt shareholders that are themselves investment vehi-
cles (such as tax-qualified retirement plans and tax-deferred annui-
ties) will resist integration if it does not preserve their advantage 
relative to taxable shareholders. Importantly, the concerns of these 
interests—even though they are, at their core, simply concerns 
about a level playing field—resonated with lawmakers. That sug-
gests that the dividend-exclusion model is more likely to encounter 
political turbulence here than is the imputation-credit model, be-
cause the imputation-credit model can extend the benefit of inte-
gration to tax-exempt shareholders by providing refundable credits 
for corporate-level tax.246 Indeed, the imputation-credit model of-
fers a high degree of flexibility on this point: under the model, 
shareholder-level credits can be made entirely or only partially re-
fundable, allowing the government to extend the full benefit of in-
tegration to tax-exempt shareholders or only so much of the bene-
fit as is necessary to buy their non-opposition. 
Still, the imputation-credit model may present its own difficul-
ties. Over the past decade, European countries generally have 
moved away from integration based on the imputation-credit 
model to integration based on the dividend-exclusion model (or at 
least reduced taxation of dividends).247 Although the driver of that 
movement generally is internal to the law of the European Un-
ion,248 the fact remains that integration on the imputation-credit 
model would put the United States out of step with the integration 
approach now taken by significant U.S. trading partners. Certainly 
that asymmetry is a cause of potential policy concern. Whether it 
would also be a cause for potential political concern would depend, 
in part, on whether U.S. corporations with international operations 
consider asymmetric integration to be sufficiently troubling to op-
pose it outright. The experience with the Bush administration’s 
246 Although the dividend-deduction and the mark-to-market models both eliminate 
the corporate-level tax, they are problematic on the question of passing through tax 
preferences. The shareholder-allocation model, like the imputation-credit model, can 
extend the benefits of integration to tax-exempt shareholders. Again, though, the 
shareholder-allocation model is problematic on pass-through. 
247 Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the 
Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 Yale L.J. 1186, 1208–12 (2006). 
248 Id. 
DORAN_BOOK 4/15/2009 11:44 AM 
 
2009] The Corporate Double Tax 593 
 
dividend-exclusion proposal provides little guidance on that point: 
the proposed non-taxation of dividends generally would have har-
monized with the newer European approach to integration.249 It is 
at least possible that managers who otherwise would support inte-
gration might prefer the dividend-exclusion model to the imputa-
tion-credit model but nonetheless might prefer the imputation-
credit model to the continuation of the corporate double tax. 
Finally, policymakers would need to consider the effective date 
of any viable integration proposal. Although the agency-cost ex-
planation argues that successful integration could co-opt managers 
by precluding windfall transition gains,250 the experience under the 
Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal indicates oth-
erwise. Of all the managers, shareholders, and collateral interests 
that committed lobbying resources on the dividend-exclusion pro-
posal in 2003, no one appears to have objected to the possibility 
that existing investments would experience a windfall gain. Rather, 
managers pointed to the expected windfall as a reason for support-
ing the proposal and even asked in certain cases that the windfall 
be enlarged. Politically successful integration, then, apparently 
would extend both to post-enactment and pre-enactment invest-
ments in corporate equity. 
C. The Policy-Politics Tradeoff 
Contemplating the terms under which integration legislation 
may be more or less likely to succeed draws into the forefront the 
inevitability of a tradeoff between policy considerations and politi-
cal considerations. Both theory and experience suggest that enact-
ment of integration legislation would require Congress to minimize 
the losses and maximize the gains among managers, shareholders, 
and other parties with a stake in the corporate double tax. That, in 
turn, suggests that policymakers should be prepared to pass corpo-
rate tax preferences through to shareholders, maintain the relative 
advantage of tax-exempt and lower-bracket shareholders, and oth-
249 Graetz & Warren suggest that the European movement away from the imputa-
tion-credit model “may have influenced” the Bush administration’s decision to pro-
pose integration under the dividend-exclusion model. Id. at 1252. 
250 Arlen & Weiss, supra note 7, at 365. 
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erwise preserve or even exacerbate the uneven effects of the status 
quo for managers, shareholders, and collateral interests. The in-
herent flexibility of the imputation-credit model makes it a promis-
ing vehicle for political concessions and compromises: one can 
readily envision a gerrymandered imputation-credit system that 
passes through certain tax preferences but not others, that allows 
refundable credits to certain shareholders but not others, and that 
confers substantial windfall transition gains. In short, one can imag-
ine an integration system that looks as imperfect as any successful 
tax legislation that fuses sound theory with political expediency. 
That raises the further question of whether integration would be 
worth the effort. The strong consensus among academics and poli-
cymakers in favor of integrating the corporate and individual in-
come taxes depends heavily on the argument that integration 
would remove significant distortions caused by the corporate dou-
ble tax. Perhaps successful integration would remove or at least 
ease certain distortions under current law—for example, the pref-
erence for debt financing over equity financing—but the compro-
mises and concessions required by the political process likely 
would introduce new distortions. It is hardly clear that, on balance, 
an actual system of integration that could emerge from the legisla-
tive process would be comparable to any of the theoretical systems 
of integration that would enter the legislative process. The experi-
ence of the Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal 
might be most instructive on that simple point: there may be too 
many entrenched and heterogeneous interests affected by integra-
tion to permit enactment of any system that academics and policy-
makers would consider a clear improvement over the corporate 
double tax. Actual integration may be nothing more than a difficult 
step sideways. 
CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the corporate double tax reveals uneven burdens on 
corporations, uneven burdens on shareholders, and uneven effects 
on third parties that provide goods and services to corporations 
and shareholders. The heterogeneity of existing interests directly 
implies that elimination or mitigation of the corporate double tax 
would affect different managers, shareholders, and collateral inter-
ests differently. Very simply, winners under the status quo should 
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be resistant to integration, and losers under the status quo should 
be supportive of the change. However, the analysis of potential 
winners and losers becomes complicated once the widely varied 
models of integration are considered. These models have hetero-
geneous effects on managers, shareholders, and collateral interests, 
implying that any particular proposal for integration inevitably will 
draw both support and opposition. The lobbying experience under 
the Bush administration’s dividend-exclusion proposal confirms 
the importance of these considerations. This implies that successful 
integration—as with any successful tax legislation having signifi-
cant effects on entrenched interests—would require extensive po-
litical compromises. In the end, actual integration may be as unat-
tractive as the existing corporate double tax. 
 
